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1 Introduction 
 
"The nature of the [sports] industry is such that competitors must be of 
approximately equal "size" if any are to be successful; this seems to be a 
unique attribute of professional competitive sports." 
- Simon Rottenberg, 1956, p.242 
 
The demand for professional sport is closely linked to the competition’s 
uncertainty of outcome. Without this uncertainty, spectators would lose 
interest in watching sport events, which would be predictable and dull. 
For Simon Rottenberg, the founder of sport economic research, this hy-
pothesis is one of the central characteristics of the professional sports in-
dustry. In contrast to other industries, sports competitors create a good 
conjointly. There can be no competition without an opponent. Further-
more, it is not sufficient merely to have an opponent, it also has to be sim-
ilar in terms of sporting quality. Otherwise, the competition would be too 
one-sided and therefore predictable for the spectators. Thus, in profes-
sional sports, individual decisions lead to the creation of a good, the quali-
ty of which depends on the difference in quality of the various opponents. 
The uncertainty-of-outcome hypothesis seems to be so intuitive and quin-
tessential for sport competition, that the difficulties involved in describing 
and interpreting it economically is initially surprising. Of peculiar im-
portance is the topic of competitive balance in sports, due to the many 
regulatory interventions frequently justified by the need to improve this 
competitive balance. These interventions constrain free competition, re-
strict the freedom of contract and often conflict with the general law. 
However, without a comprehensive understanding of competitive balance 
in sports, these market interventions are hardly justifiable. Hence, provid-
ing new insight into this issue is the aim of the present thesis. According-
ly, reasons for competitive imbalances within sport leagues, beyond the 
well-established ones, are considered. Furthermore, different measures of 
outcome uncertainty, as well as its numerous dimensions, are presented. 
Moreover, the interdependence between competitive balance and the de-
mand for a professional sport event is discussed. In order to gain more in-
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sight into the phenomenon of competitive balance in sports, existing ap-
proaches are extended and new methods introduced. 
In Chapter 2, Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, on the basis of a general model of 
sport team investment behavior, model extensions are presented, which 
provide a more sophisticated explanation of talent allocation in a sport 
league. Several sport teams compete in the factor market over talent, and 
on the field with their talent. The theoretical equilibrium level of competi-
tive balance in sports leagues are often derived from and analyzed by 
means of models based on the first mathematical formulization of El-
Hodiri and Quirk (1971). In these models, sport league teams invest in 
talent which is an input factor in the production of winning probability of 
a team. It is this probability that generates a team's revenue. The specifica-
tion of the revenue, cost and production function as well as the team's ob-
jective have been discussed comprehensively in the economic literature, 
and the assumptions regarding the function specifications exert a major 
influence on the competitive balance predicted by the models and the abil-
ity to alter it. However, the only consensus in the literature is on the basic 
properties of the revenue function. According to the uncertainty-of-
outcome hypothesis, the revenue function should be concave with a max-
imum value at a winning percentage below one. 
As a slight variation of the famous Sigmund Freud quotation, a sports 
economist could say: "The great question that has never been answered is: 
What does a sports team want? “ The discussion on the true objective of 
sport teams goes back to Sloane (1971). Before that research article, sport 
teams were regarded as behaving like regular firms, so their assumed ob-
jective was that of maximizing profits. Since Sloane (1971), there has 
been broad debate on whether teams may in fact attempt to maximize 
their sporting success instead, and thus their employed talent, while being 
restricted to a budget constraint often specified as break-even. When con-
fronted with the large losses, that sports teams sometimes incur, some 
economists have stated that teams are not even restricted by this zero prof-
it condition and teams therefore overinvest in talent. However, the rela-
tionship between investment and profit is not unique to the sports indus-
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try. Teams invest in talent, which produces a winning probability, which 
generates revenue, which is then used to invest in more talent. In the sport 
economic literature, one-period models of investment are often used, 
which are not sufficient to depict this cycle of investment and profits. To 
shed some new light on the question of whether the objective of teams re-
ally is to maximize profits or rather sporting success, in Chapter 2 an al-
ternative objective is presented. Players are a tradable good with an inher-
ent value and which do generate additional value for a team. With this ap-
proach, teams not try to maximize sporting success or profits, rather than 
maximizing their value, which means that they attempt to maximize suc-
cess and profits. This is a more accurate description of the abovemen-
tioned investment circle. Furthermore, it can be shown that low profits or 
even losses are unproblematic for sports teams, as long as they are in ac-
cordance with value maximization, and therefore do not reflect overin-
vestment. 
Beside the objective of win maximization, the conclusion that sport teams 
tend to overinvest in talent can be derived by applying alternative equilib-
rium concepts. The well-established approach in the sport economic lit-
erature, given that sport is assumed to be a non-cooperative game, is to 
find the Nash equilibrium for a sport league. Alternatively, it is possible to 
determine an evolutionarily stable equilibrium in a sport league, which is 
a refinement of the Nash equilibrium. Grossman (2013) shows that teams 
invest more in the evolutionarily stable equilibrium than in the Nash equi-
librium. The difference between the two equilibria results from the limited 
number of teams in a sport league. For an infinite population, every evolu-
tionarily stable equilibrium is also a Nash equilibrium, but not the other 
way round. In Chapter 3, the approach of Grossman (2013) is extended by 
applying the concept of an optimal aggregate-taking strategy from Alós-
Ferrer and Ania (2005), which is a sufficient condition for a globally sta-
ble evolutionarily stable equilibrium. By restricting the parameters of the 
model to reasonable values, it can be shown that neither a Nash nor an 
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evolutionarily stable equilibrium concepts do in fact lead to overinvest-
ment, in contrast to what Grossman (2013) stated. 
A basic result of the analysis of sports leagues is that the different revenue 
potentials of teams are one of the main reasons for an unequal distribution 
of talent in a league. Teams, for which sporting success has a higher val-
ue, accumulate more talent and are therefore more successful. That talent 
will end up where it has the highest value is one of the central results of 
Rottenberg (1956). Existing models assume that teams differ in terms of 
talent valuation, because they are located in different markets. A team's 
market determines the revenue potential a team is able to realize with their 
sporting success and comprises, among other things, the number of at-
tendees, their willingness to pay and sponsor potential. Thus, differences 
in sporting success are attributable to different market sizes. Greater dif-
ferences in market size should therefore lead to a greater competitive im-
balance or dominance by teams from larger markets. By comparing this 
theoretical prediction with real league outcomes, it can be shown that this 
causality does not reveal the whole story. In reality, large market domi-
nance is not reflected in this explicitness. According to Kuper and Szy-
manski (2009), the seven largest metropolitan areas in Europe, namely 
Istanbul, Paris, Moscow, London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, and Athens, were 
never able to win the main trophy in European Club football (European 
Champion Clubs' Cup, Champions League). Aside from their unusual 
constitution from the largest metropolitan region (Randstad, Madrid, 
Rhine-Ruhr, Rhine-Main, Manchester-Liverpool are as large or even larg-
er than the abovementioned regions) and the fact that Chelsea F.C. from 
London won the Champions League in 2012, it is nevertheless evident 
that the link between size and success are not as simple as the theory sug-
gests. That a large market does not necessarily lead to success is also clear 
from looking at the most successful European teams. Hardly ever is the 
all-time leader of a country also from the largest market. In Germany, the 
most successful team is from Munich, in England from Liverpool, or in 
recent years Manchester, in France from Marseille and in Italy from Tu-
rin. Thus, in the biggest European football leagues, with the exception of 
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Spain and the most successful team being from Madrid, the all-time lead-
ers are not from the largest markets. In Chapter 4 a model is presented in 
which the markets in which the teams are located are not given exoge-
nously, but determined endogenously. With endogenous markets, teams 
from large markets may be challenged by teams in their own markets. 
This leads to regional competition and lower revenue potential for con-
tested market teams, as well as to smaller-market-team dominance. The 
implications of regional competition on the effectiveness of revenue-
sharing agreements are presented, as well as evidence on important Euro-
pean leagues, which shows the extent of regional competition.  
In Chapter 5 the competitive balance of a league is considered from a dif-
ferent perspective. Besides determining the reasons for competitive im-
balance within a sports league, another relevant topic in sports economics 
is that of evaluating the degree of imbalance in an actual league. Howev-
er, analyzing a league outcome and determining its level of competitive 
balance is challenging, due to the many dimensions of outcome uncertain-
ty. Single matches can be uncertain, as well as a season’s outcome or a 
number of consecutive seasons. The most common means of measuring 
competitive balance in sport economics is to analyze the distribution of 
wins per season. However, these measures do not consider the level of 
competitive balance due to volatility in team rankings from consecutive 
seasons. The degree of uneven point distributions is one dimension of the 
competitive balance of a league, although whether the same teams end up 
recurrently in the same positions is another. The similarity between con-
secutive seasons is analyzed by means of a geometrical approach. Season-
al outcomes in terms of point distribution and team ranking can be inter-
preted as vectors, and to determine the similarity between two vectors, the 
angle between them can be calculated. This concept is developed for a 
general sport league and applied to data for the German Bundesliga. It can 
be shown that, although point distributions become more even over time, 
seasons have become more similar in recent years. The former suggests an 
improvement and the latter a deterioration of competitive balance. 
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There are not only economic reasons for a certain level of competitive 
balance, but also sport policy. The rules of a particular sporting competi-
tion are an important factor determining the competitive outcome. For 
many sporting competitions, in the sense of a Formula One season or a 
football league, one element of these rules is the mechanism which aggre-
gates numerous events into one single ranking. In one of the world’s ma-
jor sports, the Formula One Championship, this is done with a scoring 
vector. This scoring vector has had several changes over its history, with 
the last one in 2010. In Chapter 6, these rule changes are discussed from 
the perspective of social choice and it will be shown that a scoring vector 
is the only appropriate aggregation mechanism for Formula One. This is 
followed by a discussion about the many dimensions of competitive bal-
ance in this sporting event. The uncertainty of outcome in Formula One 
comprises, for example, the length of time a season is undecided, as well 
as a maximum equal point distribution or the number of different champi-
ons. All these elements add up to uncertainty of outcome and no single 
scoring vector achieves a high competitive balance in all these areas.  
With the uncertainty of outcome being a fundamental component of a 
sport competition, it also has an influence on the spectator demand for this 
competition. The question remains of whether there might be an ideal 
competitive balance maximizing the demand for a sport competition. With 
a maximum imbalance, a sporting event would lack suspense, which is 
fundamental to demand. If all competitors are of equal strength, the result 
will be that of pure and equal chance. Whether the demand favors one of 
the two extremes, or a competitive balance in the middle, is discussed in 
Chapter 7 with respect to Formula One racing. One argument supporting 
the existence of a more imbalanced competition is that the audience might 
favor some protagonists more than others. An important feature of racing 
sport, like motorsport, cycling or athletics, especially compared to team-
sports, is that all competitors compete against each other simultaneously. 
This emphasizes the uncertainty of outcome resulting from duels at the 
top. Even though the competition as a whole might be extremely unbal-
anced, the results at the top are uncertain, due to a small group that are 
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similar in level to each other but superior to the rest of the competitors. 
Furthermore, the audience might enjoy watching their favorites being 
challenged by outsiders, more than interactions between opponents of 
equal strength. In such cases, a higher competitive imbalance would lead 
to a greater attractiveness of the sport. Using data relating to German TV 
viewers of Formula One races, it is evident that a too balanced competi-
tion is unattractive for TV Viewers, whereas fiercely contested duels at 
the top catch their attention. Chapter 8 concludes. 
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1 Introduction 
A U.S. American baseball team was recently sold for over two billion dol-
lars. Moreover, as can easily be seen in the Internet, all teams of the Ger-
man football Bundesliga, for example, are valued according their market 
value. This valuation entails a kind of ‘goodwill’, as already carried out 
for all major firms (for instance, according to the accounting rules of 
IFRS).1 However, in sport economics, teams and their players have not so 
far been analyzed as assets. Instead, investments in players are regarded as 
particularly too high when teams maximize their winning probabilities 
rather than their profit (Dietl, Franck and Roy, 2003, Dietl, Franck and 
Lang, 2008; Grossmann and Dietl, 2009; on overinvestment in talent 
through profit maximization, see Whitney, 1993; Dietl and Franck, 2000; 
Lang, Grossmann and Theiler, 2011). The reason is that almost all team 
sport models consider one period only and they do not account for the 
value of their stock of players. From a portfolio analysis point of view, 
this is hardly justifiable.  
In this paper, to the best of our knowledge, the value of teams (its stock of 
talented players) is taken into account for the first time in sport econom-
ics. In a two-period model of a league, we show how teams do invest ra-
tionally in players. In order to do so, the value of the stock of players is 
adjusted periodically according to the winning probabilities. In sport 
leagues, the profits of a team depend partly on past success, so that play-
ers can increase or decrease future profit opportunities and thus the value 
of a team. Furthermore, players often have contracts that are extended by 
one period only, so that teams are able to trade them and they thus consti-
tute tradable assets for the teams. In this model players are treated as as-
sets that provide a generic value for the team. Hence, buying and selling 
talent should not only be analyzed from the perspective of periodic reve-
nue, but also as an investment in valuable assets. 
                                        
1  Baetge, Klönne and Weber (2013) discuss the potential for and limits of an objec-
tive economic valuation of football players with monetary values.  
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The paper is structured as follows. Section two contains a general two-
period model of a league, accounting for team investments in talented 
players. In section three, the model is specified to both calculate and com-
pare profits between teams. A discussion of the model and its results is 
presented in section four with section five concluding. 
 
 
2 Players as assets: General model 
2.1 Player allocation in the first and second period 
Define the profit πi of a team i, i ε I, I = {1, …, n}, in a two-period model 
as: 
?? ? ?????????? ? ?????? ? ???????????? ? ???????? ? ????????? (1) 
with: 
Ri,j(…): revenue of team i in period j, j = {1, 2}, R’i,j(…)>0, R’’i,j(…)<0,  
wi,j: winning probability of team i in period j, 
cj: per-unit cost of talent in period j (constant), 
ti,j: employed stock of talent of team i in period j, 
r := 1/(1+ρ), ρ: discount factor, 
θi: increased value of team i in Period 2 as a function of winning probabil-
ity (success) in Period 1. 
With respect to the profit function, note that a conventional team profit 
function, extended over two periods, reads as follows: 
?? ? ?????????? ? ?????? ? ???????????? ? ?????????. (2) 
Comparing (2) with (1), the team valuation term θi is missing in (2). Equa-
tion (2) defines profit as revenue, depending on the team’s winning prob-
abilities in both periods, minus the costs of talent employed. However, 
note that (2) contains flow values only, i.e., stock values are not accounted 
for. The valuation function θi determines the ‘goodwill’ a team acquires 
during the first period, it represents the team’s value change in the second 
period due to success in period 1. Inserting equation θi into equation (2) 
yields equation (1). 
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In addition to the notation and the definitions presented so far, several fur-
ther assumptions are required to analyze profit maximization given by (1). 
First of all, it is assumed that the talent available for a league is fixed at 
? ???? ?? ??  for ? ? ???. Moreover, as is usual in sport economics, the 
winning probabilities of the periods are determined by a logit contest suc-
cess function (see Tullock, 1980; Hirschleifer, 1989; Skaperdas, 1996; for 
a discussion of the contest success function in sports, and on talent supply, 
see Fort and Winfree, 2009):  
???? ? ????? . (3) 
Notice that with a fixed supply of talent ?????????? ?
?
?? 
Inserting (3) into (1) gives:  
?? ? ???? ?????? ? ? ?????? ? ? ????? ?
????
? ? ? ???
????
? ? ? ???????. (4) 
Hence, the optimal employment of talent is determined for the first period 
by: 
?????
????? ? ??
???
????? ? ????, (5) 
and for the second period by: 
?????
????? ? ?????  (6) 
The left side of (5) and (6) encompasses the marginal total revenues of 
employing talent and the right side, total marginal costs. Note that for θi = 
0, as well as ???????? ? ?, the usual optimal employment condition for talent 
emerges. 
Hence, increases (or decreases) in marginal team value are decisive for 
the player asset value model presented here. For θi > 0, the (discounted) 
marginal value of an additional unit of talent is given by:??? ????????.  
Proposition 1: In a two-period team sport league with n teams and a fixed 
number of T talent units, the demand for talent by a team i is larger 
(smaller) in a league where players’ asset values and value changes are 
accounted for, than in a league where players’ asset values are not consid-
ered. 
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Proof: Proposition 1 follows directly by a comparison of equation (5) and 
equation (6) for θi = 0 and θi > (<) 0, respectively.// 
A first implication of Proposition 1 is that in completely balanced leagues 
with 
???? ? ?? ? ?? ? ?, (7) 
the allocation of players to teams is exactly the same, irrespective of 
whether or not players’ asset values are taken into account. Furthermore, 
the talent allocation in leagues with and without consideration of the play-
ers’ asset value the will differ, as long as the marginal asset value is dif-
ferent between the teams.  
Secondly, with the available number of talent units fixed, the reallocation 
of talent among teams means that some will increase their winning proba-
bilities, whereas the remaining teams will have lower winning probabili-
ties. In this sense, the reallocation of players is a zero-sum game. Espe-
cially with a fixed talent pool, a higher demand for talent leads to higher 
marginal costs. However, it is crucial to note that investment decisions 
according to (4) are rational and they cannot be considered ‘overinvest-
ments’, because they are in fact profit maximizing. As a consequence, 
more investment in talent cannot be attributed generally to ‘winning max-
imization’ in contrast to ‘profit maximization’. Observing apparent ‘over-
investment’ may not be valid, if the asset value of players is considered.   
 
2.2 Player reallocation in the second period 
In the previous section, teams decided at the start of each period on the 
talent allocation between them. But in a more periodic model, they could 
also give players long-term contracts and trade talent in the second period. 
In this section, teams may buy or sell players to maximize profits. Talent 
is bought and sold at a transfer price p per unit of talent. The transfer price 
is price p which clears the player transfer market (transfer market equilib-
rium): 
??? ? ????? ???? ? ???????? , (8) 
with: 
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b ε I: teams that want to buy some units of talent at the end of Period 1, 
and 
s ε I: teams that want to sell some units of talent at the end of Period 1. 
Teams chose talent at the beginning of the first period, which also deter-
mines the marginal costs per unit of talent. In the second period, each 
team i decides on the level of talent for Period 2 and the transfer of talent 
??? ? ???? ? ????, which is the difference in the levels of talent employment 
between periods 1 and 2. The transfer decisions of all teams determine the 
transfer price p. 
In general, for each team, the new profit function is determined as fol-
lows: 
?? ? ???? ?????? ? ? ?????? ? ? ????? ?
????
? ? ? ?? ?
????
? ? ? ?????? ? ????? ? ??????. (9) 
Comparing (4) with (9), the determination of profit for Period 1 is the 
same. However, for the second, several changes are to be considered. 
Firstly, the value of the existing player stock at the end of Period 1, θi, de-
pends on the talent employed (which determined the winning probability 
in period one). Secondly, the net investment in players, i.e., ti,2 – ti,1, is ac-
counted for. Note that transfer payments are paid (received) if ??? > (<) 0. 
As a consequence, transfer payments are either larger or smaller than zero, 
respectively. 
Maximizing (9) with respect to the demand for talent in periods 1 and 2, 
ti,1 and ????, yields the following first-order conditions for profit maximiza-
tion: 
???? ???? ?????????? ? ?
???
????? ? ?? ? ????? (10) 
???? ???? ?????????? ? ?? ? ?????. (11) 
The first-order condition for the employment of talent in Period 1 entails 
the discounted marginal value of the first-period stock of talent at the end 
of Period 1, rp, as well the discounted marginal team value ? ????????; both 
values are unambiguously larger than zero.  For the optimal talent demand 
in the second period, the marginal transfer payment for an additional unit 
of talent, p > 0, enters the first-order condition.  
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To shorten the notation, the following abbreviations will be used: 
?????
????? ? ? ????
? ? ???????? ? ? ??
? . 
The intertemporal optimum of talent employment results from combining 
equations (10) and (11): 
????? ? ???? ? ?? ? ???? ? ????? ? ?? ? ???, 
????? ? ????? ? ???? ? ???? ? ??. (12) 
Solving (12) for the transfer price of a talent unit, p, yields: 
? ? ????
? ?????? ?????
?????? . (13) 
From (13), it follows that a transfer price larger than zero requires: 
? ? ?? ????? ? ????? ? ????. (14) 
Proposition 2: (a) Intertemporally optimal decisions on the units of talent 
(players) in sports teams requires taking into account both the marginal 
value of additional talent units, as well as the asset value of the existing 
stock of talent (incorporated in players). (b) Transfer payments smooth the 
intertemporal talent allocation among teams, as they increase first-period 
and decrease second-period talent demand. 
Proof: (a) It is worthy emphasizing that for conventional profit maximiza-
tion, an intertemporal optimum of talent employment requires: 
????? ? ????? . (15) 
Comparing equation (15) with equation (12) reveals that both equations 
are equal only if, at the same time, the marginal stock value change in 
player assets, θi, as well as the transfer price for a unit of talent, p, are ze-
ro. Hence, equations (15) and (12) will not necessarily be equal. Accord-
ing to (14), the transfer price for a talent unit may be larger than zero. 
Moreover, inserting equation (13) into the first-period optimality condi-
tion of talent employment, equation (10), and solving the equation for θi, 
results in: 
??? ? ?? ???? ? ??? ? ????? ? ?????? ?. (16) 
Hence, the marginal stock value change of players is also not necessarily 
zero. Consequently, the intertemporal optimality conditions in (12) and 
(15) may differ. 
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(b) The transfer value of a talent unit, p, enters the optimality conditions 
for periods 1 and 2 on the respective right sides of equations (10) and 
(11). However, the sign of this transfer price is negative in equation (10) 
and positive in equation (11). This means that the transfer price increases 
talent employment in the first period and decreases it in the second. In this 
way, a team’s talent employment is smoothed intertemporally. //   
 
2.3 Revenue sharing and transfer payment sharing 
In order to improve competitive balance, revenue sharing is advisable. 
Such a policy seems effective at first glance, as the reason for an unbal-
anced league is unequal potential team revenue. There is a lengthy debate 
in the sport economics literature on the effectiveness of revenue sharing 
agreements whose results depend to a large extent on specific assump-
tions. Stated first by Rottenberg (1956) and formalized by El-Hodiri and 
Quirk (1971), revenue sharing does not affect talent allocation within a 
league. When sharing does not affect the equalization of marginal product 
of talent investments across teams, it does not change talent allocation in a 
league (Winfree and Fort, 2012). This holds true in the basic model with 
profit maximizing teams and a fixed talent supply (e.g. Szymanski, 2003; 
Vrooman, 1995). If the talent supply is perfectly elastic, Rottenberg’s 
(1956) invariance principle does not hold (Szymanski and Kesenne, 2004; 
Kesenne, 2005). The principle does not hold either if the team’s objective 
is win-percentage maximization (Kesenne, 2006; Vrooman, 2008). More-
over, a non-linear tax-subsidy scheme renders the invariance principle in-
valid (Marburger, 1997), as does a progressive payroll tax (van der Burg 
and Prinz, 2005).  
To check whether revenue sharing has an effect in a model of flow and 
stock values of talent, it is assumed that in the respective flow model, the 
invariance result for revenue sharing applies. 
 
Revenue sharing without long-term contracts 
There are several possible revenue sharing schemes presented in the lit-
erature (see, e.g., Vrooman, 2007); in this paper so-called pool revenue 
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sharing is applied. Each team retains a share ? of its own revenue. The 
remainder of its own revenues, ? ? ?, is used to fund a revenue pool that 
is divided equally among all teams. Without long-term contracts, the prof-
it of a team i is given by: 
?? ? ? ????? ?????? ? ? ?????? ?
????
? ?? ???
???
? ????? ?
????
? ? ? ???? ?
????
? ? ?
?? ????? ?????? ?????? ?
????
? ??? ? ?????? ? ? ??? ?
????
? ? ? ???????. 
Note that in a two-team league 
???
??? ? ?
???
??? ; thus, with a fixed supply of 
talent,  
???
??? ? ?
?
?.  
Hence, the optimal employment of talent is determined in the first period 
by: 
??????? ? ???? ?????? ? ????? ? ? ????? ? ???,  (17) 
and in the second period by: 
????????? ? ???? ??????? ? ????? ? ? ????. (18) 
The equilibrium conditions implied by (17) and (18) are: 
?????? ? ????? ? ?????? ? ????? (19) 
for the first period and: 
????? ? ????? . (20) 
for the second period. These conditions do not differ from those implied 
by (5) and (6), so that revenue sharing does not affect the league’s equilib-
rium talent allocation. 
 
Revenue sharing with long-term contracts 
With long-term contracts, talent becomes a marketable commodity in the 
second period. Thus, with a pooled revenue sharing agreement, the reve-
nues of a team i are: 
?? ? ? ????? ?????? ? ? ?????? ?
????
? ?? ?
???
? ????? ?
????
? ? ? ???? ?
????
? ? ?
?? ????? ?????? ?????? ?
????
? ??? ? ????? ? ? ??? ?
????
? ? ? ?????? ? ?????? ? ??????.
 (21) 
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The respective first-order conditions for talent employment are: 
???? ? ???????? ? ???? ?????? ? ????? ? ? ????? ? ??? ? ????, (22) 
?????? ????????? ? ???? ??????? ? ????? ? ? ?? ? ????. (23) 
Both first-order conditions also imply a league equilibrium independent of 
?.  
Hence, treating players as assets for teams does not alter the ineffective-
ness of revenue sharing in a two team league with a fixed talent supply 
and profit maximizing teams.   
 
Transfer payment sharing with long-term contracts 
However, the result may be changed if revenue sharing is replaced by 
transfer payment sharing only. Suppose that a team s selling talent obtains 
a share of α of the transfer payment, share (1-α) of the payment flows into 
the sharing pool and is distributed equally among the teams. Team s sells 
(ti,2 – ti,1) units of talent at price p in a two-team league and earns the fol-
lowing payment after the redistribution of transfer payments: 
??? ? ? ??????? ? ????? ? ???? ????? ? ?????? ? ?
???
? ????? ? ?????. 
For a team b buying the respective units of talent, the net transfer payment 
with transfer revenue sharing is: 
 ??? ? ?? ?????? ? ????? ? ???? ????? ? ?????? ? ??
???
? ????? ? ?????. 
In the model applied here, the respective equations (22) and (23) change 
for both teams to: 
???? ? ? ????? ? ????? ? ?? ? ???? ?????,  (24) 
?????? ?????? ? ?? ? ???? ?? ??.  (25) 
The intertemporally optimal decision rule is then: 
????? ? ????? ? ???? ? ???? ???? ? ??. (26) 
Proposition 3: Linear transfer payment sharing in a pool system changes 
the intertemporal demand for talent within teams for 0 < α < 1. With con-
cave revenue functions, more talent is demanded in the second period, rel-
ative to the talent demand in the first period. 
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Proof: Since the right side of equation (26) decreases due to transfer 
payment sharing (because of (1+α)/2 < 1), talent demand is reallocated 
from period 1 to period 2. //  
Proposition 4: The allocation of talent among teams is not changed by 
linear transfer payment sharing. 
Proof: A two-team league equilibrium with transfer payment sharing de-
rived from (24) and (25) requires: ????? ? ????? ? ????? ? ????? for the first 
period and ????? ? ?????  for the second. 
Both equilibrium conditions are independent of the sharing parameter α. 
Hence, transfer payment sharing has no effect on talent allocation among 
teams in a league. // 
 
3 Players as assets: Specified model 
In the following analysis, a specified version of the general model is ex-
amined for a two-period two-team league. 
Profits of each team i = 1,2 are given by: 
?? ? ???? ? ??????.  (28) 
As before, revenues are Ri,j, j = 1,2 as periods and costs are denoted by 
Ci,j. With parameter ?? ? ?, teams are able to earn more (less) profit in 
period 2 if they were more (less) successful in period 1. Future revenues 
are discounted as before by the factor r = 1/(1+ρ) (with ρ as the discount 
rate). 
The valuation function fi is given by: 
???????? ? ?? ? ????? ? ????. (29) 
According to equation (29), a team’s value depends on a valuation param-
eter ??, as well as on the difference in the team’s own winning probability 
wi,1, realized in the first period, minus the average winning probabilities 
over all teams, given by: ?? ? ???? ?
?
?? . For two teams, the average win-
ning probability is obviously 0.5.  
The valuation parameter ?? determines the ‘goodwill’ a team acquires dur-
ing the first period. Notice that the valuation parameter, as well as its rev-
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enue potential, is team-specific. From equation (29), it follows that the 
value of a team may increase or decrease, depending on the difference be-
tween the team’s own winning probability and the average winning prob-
ability of all teams. The team’s stock value increases (decreases) if its 
winning probability is higher (lower) than that of all teams together. Alt-
hough a great variety of valuation functions is conceivable, the valuation 
function defined by equation (29) seems to be sufficient for this paper. 
The revenue earned by team i in period j is given by the following specifi-
cation (see, for instance, Vrooman, 2007): 
???? ? ?????? ???? ????? . (30) 
with m as the market size, w as the winning probability, and ? as a fan 
preference parameter for competitive balance. The cost function Ci,j is as-
sumed to be linear with constant marginal costs cj for each unit of talent, 
the usual assumption in sports economics. 
 
3.1 Optimizing talent employment in both periods   
The (discounted) total profit of team i is given by: 
?? ? ???? ? ???? ? ??????? ? ???? ? ???.  (31) 
Inserting the specifications defined by equations (29) and (30), the profit 
maximization program is as follows: 
?????????????? ? ?????? ? ?
?
? ????? ? ???? ? ? ??????? ??
?
? ????? ? ???? ? ?? ?
????? ? ?????.  (32) 
Together with the contest success function (3), the two first-order condi-
tions are: 
??????? ? ?? ??? ? ???? ? ???? (33) 
??????? ? ?? ??? ? ?????  (34) 
Together with the adding-up constraints, the talent employment optimum 
and, thus the winning percentages are given by:  
???? ? ???????????????????   (35) 
and 
???? ? ???????????????????   (36) 
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for the first period and 
???? ? ?????????  (37) 
and 
???? ? ?????????  (38) 
for the second period. 
Let the ‘goodwill’ parameters be equal for both teams, θ1 = θ2. It then 
holds that: 
???? ? ?????????  (39) 
and 
 ???? ? ?????????  (40) 
in the first period. 
Hence, in this case, the valuation of earlier success has no influence on the 
allocation of talent. Differing ‘goodwill’ parameters imply that equal suc-
cess may have different effects on the valuation of the stock of players. If 
such a difference occurs, talent allocation will adapt accordingly and tal-
ent allocation is changed by ‘goodwill’.  
In addition, the valuation of a team’s talent stock will alter marginal costs. 
In a closed league, marginal talent costs are endogenous. In the model 
specified here, marginal talent costs are given by:  
?? ? ???????????????????  (41) 
and 
 ?? ? ????????? . (42) 
If both stock valuation parameters are equal, i.e., θ1 = θ2, marginal costs 
are the same for both periods. Nevertheless, even if the parameters are the 
same, there is an economic effect, because the valuation parameters enter 
the winning probabilities as differences, whereas marginal costs are in-
corporated as a sum. Therefore, a higher marginal valuation of talent in 
the second period implies lower profits in the first period. The ‘goodwill’ 
value of the teams’ stock of players increases the payments to players in 
Period 1, as a result of the more intense competition for talent. Hence, low 
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profits in one period do not necessarily imply ‘overinvestment’ or ‘non-
profit-maximizing behavior’, as suggested in the sports economics litera-
ture (Whitney, 1993; Dietl and Franck, 2000; Dietl, Franck and Roy, 
2003; Dietl, Franck and Lang, 2008; Grossmann and Dietl, 2009; Lang, 
Grossmann and Theiler, 2011). 
 
3.2 Talent reallocation in the second period 
If teams buy talent for both periods and trade them before the second pe-
riod, the maximization program is given by: 
?????????????? ? ???? ? ?? ? ?????? ? ?? ? ??????? ? ???? ? ?????? ? ??????. (43) 
In combination with the contest success function in (3), the two first-order 
conditions are: 
??????? ? ?? ??? ? ???? ? ?? ? ?????? (44) 
and 
??????? ? ?? ??? ? ?? ? ????? (45) 
The respective winning percentages are given by: 
 ???? ? ???????????????????  (46) 
and 
 ???? ? ???????????????????  (47) 
for the first period and  
???? ? ?????????  (48) 
and 
 ???? ? ?????????  (49) 
for the second period. 
Consequently, the allocation of talent does not differ from that of the pre-
vious section 3.1. If the valuation parameters are the same for both teams, 
the allocation of talent will be the same for both periods and thus no trad-
ing of talent will occur at the start of Period 2. The value change due to 
former success changes the allocation of talent, whereas trading talent for 
money does not. However, trading talent changes the distribution of prof-
its, as the marginal talent costs c are given by: 
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 ? ? ??????????????????????????????????  . (50) 
The price p for a unit of transferred talent results in:  
? ? ??????????????? . (51) 
Finally, the profits of teams with, as well as without talent transfers be-
tween teams (sections 3.1 and 3.2, respectively), are compared (Table 1). 
Since the talent allocations are the same with and without transfer pay-
ments, the profit differences are determined by the talent cost differences.  
 
Table 1: Cost (profit) differences between the model with and without 
players transfer payments 
 
Costs model 
in 3.1 
Costs model  
in 3.2 
Cost difference  
(model 3.1 – model 3.2) 
Period 1 ??????  ?????? 
??? ? ??????? ? ?
????????
??????? ????  
? ? 
Period 2 ??????  
??????
? ??????? ? ????? 
???????????????? ???? ?
????????
??????? ????? ? ?????  
? ? 
Total  
(Period 1 
+  
Period 2) 
?????? ?
????????  
?????? ? ????????
? ????????? ? ????? 
?????? ? ?? ? ??? ? ??????? ? ?? ? ????  
? ? 
 
Although a talent transfer system changes neither the allocation of talent 
nor total profits in a two-period model, it nevertheless changes the period 
in which profits are earned. With a transfer system, profits are higher in 
the first period.  
 
4 Discussion 
In this paper, the asset value of the stock of players is incorporated into a 
standard model of sport economics. This approach requires an inter-
temporal model instead of the usual one-period model. In contrast to the 
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results from the standard approach (Dietl, Franck and Roy, 2003; Dietl, 
Franck and Lang, 2008; for overinvestments in talent with profit maximi-
zation, see Whitney, 1993; Dietl and Franck, 2000), in our approach no 
‘overinvestment’ could be found. Especially the usual result that winning 
maximization - in contrast to profit maximization - is prone to overin-
vestment in talent does not to be valid. From an observational viewpoint, 
large investments in talent – even with losses being incurred – cannot be 
attributed to an objective maximizing wins. Hence, winning and profit 
maximization are not easily distinguishable from one another empirically.  
In contrast to overinvestment, player hoarding may occur in sport teams. 
It should be emphasized, however, that overinvestment and player hoard-
ing are different team strategies. Player hoarding is a strategy which is 
similar to a well-known industry strategy of ‘raising rivals’ costs’. In a 
sport league, dominant teams may earn so much money that they can buy 
talent that is not even employed in matches. To prevent such a strategy, 
closed U.S. leagues restrict the number of players a team is allowed to 
employ. In contrast, European professional soccer leagues have not im-
posed such restrictions so far.  
Investing in players as assets seems to be a preferred strategy especially in 
imperfect capital markets. In perfect capital markets, the risks of playing 
in a league might be covered in various different ways that do not require 
players as assets. Moreover, financing sport teams with loans or issuing 
shares would be perfect substitutes. In imperfect capital markets, treating 
players as assets might be necessary to finance a team; in this case, play-
ers could be seen as collaterals for risky credits. Since credits and equity 
are no longer perfect substitutes, credits will be preferred. Material collat-
erals that can be sold are necessary in order to secure credits. Therefore, 
players as assets may emerge over time because of capital market imper-
fections. 
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5 Conclusions 
In this paper, players of sport teams are modeled as assets. In addition to 
the usual approach in sport economics, an intertemporal model of sport 
teams is employed to analyze the consequences of players as assets in 
team sports.  
The most important result is that investing in talented players should not 
generally be dubbed ‘overinvestment’, since player assets can be sold, if 
necessary. Although such approaches are quite common in industrial eco-
nomics, they are new in sport economics. Revaluations of assets do indeed 
have consequences for the employment of talented players. In such a situ-
ation, winning teams may, for instance, achieve an increase in their team 
value and thus invest optimally through buying more talent, as indicated 
by Tobin’s q-theory of investment (Tobin, 1969; Hayashi, 1982; Abel et 
al., 1996; Adda and Cooper, 2003, pp. 187 ff.).  
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1 Introduction 
In Grossmann (2013) the existence of an evolutionary stable strategy 
(ESS) for sport teams is proposed that represents an equilibrium that is 
different from the Nash solution (NS) for a sport league. In this ESS 
teams invest more in talent and gain lower profits. This result is somewhat 
astounding since an ESS is commonly interpreted as a Nash refinement, 
i.e., an ESS should be also a Nash equilibrium. In this note it is intended 
to clarify the seemingly contradiction by applying the so-called “optimal 
aggregate-taking strategy (ATS)” introduced by Alós-Ferrer and Ania 
(2005). Moreover, the general result of Grossmann (2013) is qualified. 
The rest of the note is structured as follows: First, the Grossmann (2013) 
model is briefly presented. In the third section, the ATS approach is ap-
plied on the teams’ investment decisions in a sport league. The fourth sec-
tion concludes. 
 
2 Grossmann’s approach 
In the Grossmann model ? ? ? symmetric teams compete to win a con-
test. Profits for team i are the difference between revenues ?? and costs ??: 
?????? ? ? ??? ? ?????? ??? ? ? ??? ? ??????. (1) 
Teams invest xi in order to increase their winning probability ?? that are 
given by a Tullock contest success function (CSF): 
??????? ? ??? ? ??
?
? ???????
? (2) 
Revenues are specified in a usual way by: 
?????? ??? ? ? ??? ? ???? ? ?? ???. 
Costs are given by a convex cost function with constant marginal costs, c. 
The parameter b represents the effect of competitive balance on the de-
mand for the sport event and ?? represents the market size of a team i. 
Since all teams are identical market sizes are equal:  ?? ? ???? ?
??? ? ?. 
The objective of team owners is to maximize their utility, which consists 
of a weighted sum of profits and winning probability. The weight for prof-
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its is ? and for winning percentages ? ? ?. A team owner’s utility is giv-
en by: 
 ?? ? ? ?? ? ?? ? ???? ? ???? ? ????? ? ?? ? ????? (3) 
 
Nash equilibrium 
Clubs maximize (3) with respect to ??; this gives n first-order conditions 
(FOCs): 
???
??? ? ? ???
???
??? ? ????
???
??? ? ?? ? ?? ? ??
???
??? ? ?. (4) 
In a symmetric solution, ?? ? ?? ? ??for ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ?, ?? ? ?? and ???
??? ?
??????
???  hold. Therefore (4) can be reduced to the symmetrical Nash 
equilibrium investment per team as: 
??? ? ??????????? ?? ?? ?
?
?? ? ?? ? ???? (5) 
In NS, all clubs invest ??? in talent and no club has an incentive to devi-
ate from (5) as it is the best response to itself.  
 
ESS 
To derive the evolutionary stable strategy ESS, Grossmann (2013) con-
siders team 1 as a representative team. Under ESS, this team tries to max-
imize its relative utility compared to their opponent ? ? ?. Suppose that 
all other clubs choose  ????. Team 1’s optimal choice of x1 must be equal 
to ???? in the following maximization program for ???? being an ESS: 
???? ????? ????? ? ????? ????? ? ? ????? ? ????? ????? ? ? ??????with j? ?. (6) 
The FOC for this maximization program reads: 
???
?? ? ? ??
???
?? ? ????
???
?? ? ?? ? ?? ? ??
???
?? ? ?? ???
?????
?? ?
?????? ??????? ?? ? ?? ? ??
?????
?? ? ? ??? (7) 
In a symmetric solution ?? ? ???? ? ?? holds true, thus (7) can be simpli-
fied to: 
?????? ???
?????
?? ? ?? ?? ?
?
?? ? ?? ? ??? ? ??? ? ?. 
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Likewise, due to symmetry, ????? ?
??????
???  and 
?????
?? ? ?
?
???; this implies 
the ESS solution: 
???? ? ???? ?? ?? ?
?
?? ? ?? ? ??? ?
?
??? ?? ?? ? ? ?
?
?? ? ??? (8) 
The first expression on the right-hand side of equation (8) shows that ???? 
and ??? are similar, but not identical (whereby the second expression on 
the right-hand side of equation (8) is Grossmann’s (2013) solution). As a 
consequence, ???? and ??? are different, implying that the evolutionary 
stable strategy equilibrium is not a Nash equilibrium.  
In order to see the relation between NS and ESS as well as their diver-
gence for finite populations, the following simplification is applied. 
The maximization of relative utility (6) can be reformulated to: 
???? ????? ????? ? ????? ????? ? ? ????? ? ?? ? ????? ????? ? ? ????????? . (9) 
With ? ?? ? ????? , ? ?????? ? ?
????  and the symmetrical equilibrium condi-
tion ?? ? ?? for ? ? ?? ? ? ? ?, the FOC for the maximization program in (9) 
reads: 
???
??? ?
???
??? ?
???
? ? ?. (10) 
According to equation (10), the FOC for an evolutionary stable strategy is 
given by the sum of the FOC for a Nash strategy plus a constant term. In-
serting equation (4) into equation (10) and rearranging terms gives again 
the ESS solution:  
???? ? ?????????????????
?? ?? ? ??? ? ?? ? ??? ? ?
?
???? ?? ?? ?
?
?? ? ?? ? ???. (11) 
The expression 1/n in equation (11) results from the constant term. As is 
easy to see, for an infinite population ESS and NS coincide.  
 
3 An alternative approach 
Although Grossmann’s solution is new in sports economics, it is not new 
in game theory (see the literature quoted by Grossmann). Moreover, more 
recent game theoretic literature provides a tool to present Grossmann’s 
results by an alternative approach that is more rigorous, the so-called “op-
timal aggregate-taking strategy” (ATS), introduced by Alós-Ferrer and 
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Ania (2005). ATS is generally applicable in games where the payoff of 
one player depends on its own strategy choice as well as on an aggregate 
of all players’ choices. The main reasons to apply this concept are first 
that an ATS is in certain cases more comprehensive than ESS, i.e., “a 
strict ATS is a sufficient condition for globally stable ESS” (Alós-Ferrer 
and Ania, 2005, p. 507) and second that an ATS is much easier intuitively 
to understand than ESS. Although Grossmann’s approach (based on 
Schaffer, 1988) is mathematically sound, it seems not so at first glance. 
The reason is that the impression is generated as if another utility function 
is maximized to get the ESS strategy equilibrium than a Nash strategy 
one. As Ania (2008) pointed out, the difficulty is that a pure strategy Nash 
equilibrium is not ESS with a finite population playing the respective 
game, but that also the ESS equilibrium is not a Nash equilibrium (and, 
hence, might be itself beaten). Although this is a well-known result of 
game theory (see, e.g., Gintis, 2009, p. 240) it can be confusing neverthe-
less.     
The above mentioned ATS may help to understand better the difference 
between Nash and ESS equilibria in games with finite populations as in a 
sport league. The formalization of Grossmann’s investment in talent of 
sport leagues teams with an ATS reads as follows (see Alós-Ferrer & 
Ania, 2005, p. 507): 
????? ?????? ????? ? ? ???? ? ???? ? ???? ? ?? ? ????  
? ?? ? ?? ? ? ???? ???????? ? ?
?
? ?
???
? ????????
?
?
? ? ?? ? ?? ? ???? ???????? ? ? ????. (12) 
Equation (12) transforms the strategic choice of team i into a game where 
the team chooses its talent investment by supposing that all other teams 
will not change their choices due to the choice of its talent investment. 
This means that team i is playing against all other teams at once instead of 
team-by-team basis concerning talent investment. This can most easily be 
recognized by the winning probability pi (which is given by a Tullock 
contest success function as in Grossmann, 2013): 
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?? ? ? ??
?
? ????????
?.          
The numerator represents team i’s choice of talent investment whereas the 
denominator represents the sum of all teams’ optimal talent investments, 
in other words, the aggregate of the game. Note that the latter is not influ-
enced by the talent investment of team i. The first-order condition for the 
maximization program in equation (9) reads: 
????? ?
??? ?????
? ? ? ???? ?? ?
?
??? ? ?? ? ??
?
??? ? ?? ? ? .   
Therefore: 
?? ? ?? ? ???? ?? ?? ?
?
?? ? ?? ? ??? ??????? ? ?? ? ? ?
?????????????
?? ?. (13) 
These are the same values as in Grossmann (2013), but derived with a 
shortcut. However, note that this value of x* is a globally stable ESS for 
strict ATS only. ATS is strict, if the ui(…) function in equation (12) is 
strictly concave in xi (Alós-Ferrer and Ania, 2005, p. 507), i.e. if: 
???????? ???? ?????
????
? ?. 
Since 
???????? ???? ?????
????
? ???????????? ??? ? ?????? ? ?? ? ?? ?
???????????
?????? ?, (14) 
the sign of the second derivative depends on the term in the {…} brack-
ets: 
????? ???????? ???? ????????? ? ????? ??? ? ?????? ? ?? ? ?? ?
???????????
?????? ?.
 (15) 
Hence, the sign depends on: 
? ? ????????????????????????????? , (16) 
and 
? ? ???????????????????????????? . (17) 
 
Inserting Δ from equation (16) and Γ from equation (17) into equation 
(15) yields: 
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????? ???????? ???? ????????? ? ????????? ? ??. (18) 
Note the Γ is larger than zero for xi* > 0 in any equilibrium, which follows 
from (13), whereas the sign of Δ may be larger or smaller than zero. 
Hence the sign of the second derivative of the utility function in the game 
context is defined as follows: 
???????? ???? ?????
????
? ?  (19) 
if: 
????? ? ?? ? ? ?, 
????? ? ?? ? ? ?? ? ??. 
Consequently, the general result of Grossmann (2013) holds true only in 
case (a). In case (b), however, it cannot be said that xi* is ESS for all r > 
0. This is an important restriction of the generality of Grossmann’s result 
even in the case of a specified revenue function.  
These results are summarized in the following proposition: 
Proposition 1: The optimal aggregate-taking strategy ATS given by 
?? ? ?? ? ???? ?? ?? ?
?
?? ? ?? ? ??? is a globally stable ESS for Δ ≤ 0 
and r > 0 or for Δ > 0 and r < Γ/Δ, respectively. For Δ > 0 and r ≥ Γ/Δ, it 
cannot be said generally whether x* is an ESS. 
Proof: See above.// 
Remark: Given Δ > 0, it follows Γ/Δ > 1 by comparing equations (16) 
and (17). Hence, 1 < r < Γ/Δ. This means that x* is an ESS even if the 
Tullock contest success function exhibits increasing returns, up to a cer-
tain extent.  
Rent overdissipation 
Grossman defined the rent dissipation D as the ratio of the sum of invest-
ments ? ??????  in equilibrium and the total sum of expected rents in the 
league  ? ??????? ? ?. For two reasons this definition of total expected 
rents in the league is a bit surprising. First, the competitive balance pa-
rameter b does not enter the equation. As a consequence, the total sum of 
expected rents in the league (which Grossman, 2013, uses as an equivalent 
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to the feasible revenues) is higher than the maximally feasible revenue of 
the leagues, except for b = 0. Second, the maximum of the expected rents 
is also independent of ?. For ? ? ? teams generate utility from revenues 
as well as from winning percentages. Nevertheless, the total sum of talent 
investments is compared with feasible revenues only for the analysis of 
rent dissipation. Furthermore, another crucial aspect is the cost function 
for talent. In the Grossmann (2013) model, teams invest an amount xi in 
order to increase their winning percentage; hence their costs are exactly xi. 
The price for investing an additional unit of xi is then exactly 1; moreover, 
there is no justification in the paper for unit costs of  ? ? ? for talent. In 
this setup the possibility of overdissipation does not seem surprising. To 
analyze rent dissipation carefully, we stick in the following to Gross-
mann’s definition of rent-dissipation, D, but consequently we set ? ? ?, 
? ? ? and b = 0. 
 
Nash equilibrium 
Grossman stated that even for teams attempting to maximize individual 
profits, overdissipation is possible. This is not correct, as already shown 
in, e.g., Hehenkamp et al. (2004).  
For α = 1, b = 0 and c = 1, the optimal Nash investment strategy of a team 
is given by: 
??? ? ???????? ?? (20) 
The profits of team I read: 
?? ? ???? ????. (21) 
In the symmetrical league equilibrium, each team invests the same amount 
and has the same winning probability. For ????to be a Nash equilibrium, 
profits must not be negative because otherwise either one team in a gen-
eral model or each team in a symmetrical model is better off when invest-
ing nothing. It follows that: 
?? ? ?? ?? ?
??????
?? ?? ? ?
?
???. (22) 
Hence the necessary condition for the existence of a unique Nash equilib-
rium in pure strategies is ? ? ????. 
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Rent overdissipation requires (see also Grossmann, 2013): 
? ? ? ??????? ? ?? ????? ? ?? ? ?
?
???. (23) 
Comparing (23) and (22) reveals that rent overdissipation is not compati-
ble with a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies if teams are profit 
maximizers. 
 
ESS 
For α = 1, b = 0 and c = 1, it follows form equation (16) ? ? ? and from 
equation (17) ? ? ? in an ESS of talent investment. However, from (18) 
r < 1 is required for a globally stable ESS under these circumstances. This 
condition results also from the non-negativity of profits: 
?
? ? ???? ? ? ? ?. (24) 
Rent overdissipation requires (see also Grossmann, 2013): 
?????? ? ?? ? ??? ? ?? ? ? ?. (25) 
As a consequence, rent overdissipation is not feasible in a globally stable 
talent investment ESS. 
Proposition 2: For α = 1, b = 0 and c = 1, rent overdissipation is neither 
feasible in a unique Nash equilibrium of talent investment nor in a global-
ly stable ESS. 
Proof: Compare (23) and (25) with (22) and (24), respectively. //  
As a consequence, there will be no rent overdissipation, no matter whether 
the league teams play Nash or evolutionary stable strategies. However, as 
is the case in Grossman (2013), there might be rent overdissipation when 
teams maximize utility and ignore the zero-profit restriction.  
 
4 Conclusion 
Although it is well-known that finite populations may render evolutionary 
stable strategies (ESS) non-Nash, these strategies themselves are not al-
ways unbeatable. To shed more light on the problem of how to interpret 
Nash and ESS strategies, Alós-Ferrer and Ania (2005) proposed the con-
cept of an optimal aggregate-taking strategy (ATS). An ESS is deter-
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mined by maximizing relative performance with respect to opponents 
which may create the impression as if a different objective function is 
maximized in contrast to Nash strategies. To overcome this impression, an 
ATS is defined as the maximization of the own objective function under 
the assumption that one’s own decision does not change the aggregate de-
cisions of all players. In this way the difficulty implied by the ESS ap-
proach is overcome. In addition to that, a strict ATS is sufficient for a 
globally stable ESS as proven by Alós-Ferrer and Ania (2005).  
In this note, the ATS approach is employed to check the validity of 
Grossmann’s (2013) results for team talent investments in a sports league 
context. Although the main results of Grossmann (2013) could be verified 
with the ATS approach, a restriction of the generality of the results is also 
shown. As a consequence, it might be not only easier to calculate ATS in 
a league competition context than ESS, but also clearer to interpret as well 
as to determine the global stability of the implied ESS. 
Moreover, for profit-only motivated teams and for specifications of the 
revenue function (b = 0) and the cost function (c = 1) it is shown that a 
unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies as well as a globally stable 
ESS is not compatible with rent overdissipation. 
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4 Regional Competition and Competitive Balance in 
Sports Leagues 
 
 
Martin Langen 
 
 
Abstract: A well-known finding in of sport economics is that differences 
in the winning probabilities of sport teams are determined largely by une-
qual market sizes and, therefore, revenue potential. Larger markets yield 
higher marginal revenue and thus, more units of talent being employed by 
the respective teams. In contrast to the existing literature, this paper pre-
sents a model with endogenous market sizes. Teams are able to choose 
their location at which they are based, implying a direct effect on their 
own, as well as on their opponent’s potential market size. This regional 
competition in sport leagues is analyzed in terms of overall payoff, com-
petitive balance, and effectiveness of revenue sharing agreements for 
profit-, as well as for win-maximizing team behavior. It can be shown that 
the usually assumption of a strictly positive correlation between market 
size and success does not hold in general. Furthermore, evidence relating 
to major European football leagues is presented, indicating that a larger 
market does not necessarily imply more successful teams.  
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1 Introduction 
Sports teams compete in leagues in which some teams are distinctly more 
successful than others. The fact that sport teams are based in separate re-
gional markets is considered to be the most important reason. These mar-
kets offer different revenue potential, which leads to different marginal 
revenue per unit of talent employed by the respective teams. Thus, they 
hire different amounts of talent which results in differences of sporting 
success. But taking the markets for granted seems counter-intuitive, as 
teams or at least the player talent, is highly mobile. In contrast to existing 
models of sports leagues, the approach of this paper is to allow for endog-
enous markets. Teams are able to choose their location, so that a larger 
market not only increases the marginal revenue per unit of talent, but also 
the likelihood of competitors entering this market. Under these circum-
stances, the strict relationship between market size and success no longer 
holds. 
Rottenberg (1956) was the first to analyze the competitive outcome of a 
league. He showed that the allocation of talent in a league is independent 
from the distribution of profits. The strong ties between economic and 
sporting competition in leagues were analyzed by Neale (1964) and for-
malized by El-Hodiri and Quirk (1971). There is now an extensive litera-
ture dealing with league outcomes and the resulting competitive balance. 
The objective of the teams remains a point of discussion, with some argu-
ing that teams maximize profits (e.g. Fort and Quirk, 1995; Vrooman, 
2007), others that teams maximize their win-percentage (e.g. Sloane, 
1971; Kesenne, 2007) and some for utility maximizing behavior (Dietl et. 
al., 2011), as a weighted sum of the former two. For a comparison of the 
former two, see Fort and Quirk (2004). All these league types have been 
analyzed and there is broad consensus in sport economics literature that, 
independent of the exact outcome, due to the owner’s specific objective, 
the size of the market in which a team plays is the essential factor explain-
ing team quality differences in terms of winning success (Vrooman, 1995, 
2007). Teams from larger markets have a greater incentive to employ 
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more talent, and are capable of doing so. Therefore, they are more suc-
cessful. 
From this premise, it remains unclear why teams from the largest regions 
are often not the most successful ones in a league. In this paper, the phe-
nomenon of underperforming large-market teams (or overachieving 
smaller-market teams), is explained in terms regional competition. Be-
sides competing for talent and with talent, teams are also able to compete 
over markets. In existing models of sports leagues, the markets of the 
teams are given exogenously, whereas in this paper, a model is presented 
with endogenous markets for teams. Teams are able to choose the distance 
to nearby opponents; this location choice affects their own as well as their 
opponents’ revenue potential. In short, with endogenous markets, teams 
are able to choose between different locations in order to maximize their 
revenue potential.  
Sharing a market is quite common in European as well as in American 
sport leagues. In Europe there are, for example, the football teams of Real 
Madrid and Atletico Madrid in Spain or AC Milan and Inter Milan in Ita-
ly. In American sport leagues, there are the baseball teams of the Yankees 
and the Mets in New York or the basketball teams of the Clippers and the 
Lakers in Los Angeles. A prominent difference between American and 
European sport leagues is the league entrance system. In Europe, there is a 
system of promotion and relegation, which offers at least the possibility 
for any team to compete in the highest league. In America the league de-
cides about the entrance of new franchises. It is quite common for the 
franchises to have exclusive territorial rights guaranteed by the league. If 
these rights can no longer be granted, compensation payments are com-
mon (e.g., the Anaheim Ducks had to pay $25 million to the Los Angeles 
Kings (NHL) in 1992). Thus, in both systems, regional competition occurs 
and mainly in the largest markets of the league. 
Various kinds of team movements are feasible. In all American sports 
leagues, franchises may relocate for example the former Seattle Superson-
ics, became the Oklahoma City Thunders in 2008 (NBA), the former 
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Houston Oilers became the Tennessee Oilers in 1997 (NFL), and the for-
mer Quebec Nordiques became the Colorado Avalanche in 1995 (NHL). 
In other words, the players, as well as the team’s owner, moved geograph-
ically to form a new team. In European sports leagues, such movements 
are uncommon. However, with a system of promotion and relegation, new 
teams enter a league every year, accompanied by a reallocation of talent. 
One difference between America and Europe with respect to these move-
ments is whether the talent moves with or without the team. A detailed 
analysis of promotion and relegation systems is provided in Szymanski 
and Valletti (2005). A third possibility is that teams reallocate within their 
region merely by reallocating their stadium, examples include the move of 
Arsenal London in 2006 (English Premier League) or the New Jersey Nets 
becoming the Brooklyn Nets in 2012. In the model presented below, all 
such movements are feasible, as the decisive parameter is the effect these 
talent movements have on the markets in which the teams operate.  
There is an extensive general economic literature dealing with endoge-
nous market sizes (e.g. Mankiw and Whinston, 1986), as well as literature 
focusing on sports economics. However, in sports economics the literature 
focuses on the subsidies teams are able to obtain from cities. Friedman 
and Mason (2004) develop a stakeholder approach explaining public sub-
sidies for sport facilities. For sport leagues, Owen (2003) used a model of 
a closed league, with more potential markets than teams in the league. In 
this environment, teams can threaten to leave the cities, in order to gain 
subsidies. However, teams are able to move into regions which already 
have a team and, furthermore, regional competition is not only about gain-
ing subsidies. The interdependencies associated with a reallocation of tal-
ent with respect to nearby teams, as well as with regard to the whole 
league, cannot be neglected. The model presented in this paper focuses on 
the interactions of team movements and regional competition. Aside from 
the lack of a theoretical approach in the literature, there are, however, em-
pirical studies demonstrating the effects of a relatively small distance be-
tween sport teams on stadium attendance. Buraimo et. al. (2007) as well 
as Buraimo and Simmons (2009) demonstrated the negative impact on the 
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English Premier League. Additionally, Winfree et. al. (2004) presented a 
similar study on major league baseball. In contrast, Breuer and Römmelt 
(2009) reported that a second team in the same market had no negative 
impact on the ticket sales of clubs in the German soccer Bundesliga.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, a model 
of regional competition is presented. In a two-stage game, teams choose 
their level of talent and preferred degree of regional competition. The 
basic model is introduced in Section 2.1 and the second stage equilibrium 
for a profit-maximizing league is presented in Section 2.2. The equilibri-
um for a win-percentage-maximization league is derived in Section 2.3. 
The effects on the league outcome are shown in Section 2.4, and the influ-
ence of revenue sharing on regional competition in Section 2.5. In Section 
3, some empirical findings are presented, showing that regional competi-
tion indeed has an influence on league outcome. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2 Regional competition in sports leagues 
2.1 Basic model 
The profits ?? of each team i in a n-team league are given by revenue R 
minus cost C: 
?? ? ?????????? ?????? ????? ? ??????; for i=1,..,n  (1) 
with ?? as the market size of team i and ?? as its winning probability. The 
winning probability is given by a logit contest success function (CSF), 
which defines a team’s winning probability by the ratio of employed tal-
ent ?? to total league talent: ?? ? ???? ?????? . This CSF is widely used in 
the sport economic literature. As in Szymanski (2003) or Dietl et al. 
(2011), revenue is specified by: ???? ???? ???, which is a concave func-
tion of w with a global maximum at ????? ? ??. The parameter ? ? ? 
reflects fans’ preferences for competitive balance and assumed to be the 
same for all teams. The costs are a function of ?? with constant marginal 
costs c, which are the same for each team.  
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In contrast to the existing literature, the market size ?? in this model is 
not given purely exogenously, but depends on ??, the distance to the near-
est competitor. The market of a team is given by the product of a game’s 
visitors ?? and the price ?? they are willing to pay for one unit of winning 
percentage: ?? ? ?????????????. The uniformly distributed inhabitants of a 
region decide to attend a league game on the basis of utility maximization. 
The inhabitants face different travelling costs per stadium visit. As there 
are different travelling costs, some attendees might prefer watching an-
other team if it is close enough to their own location. The total number of 
attendees is given by: ?? ? ?????????, with ??? being a region-specific pa-
rameter capturing a region’s population density and regions size; ??? de-
termines the effect of regional competition on the number of attendees. 
With a regional competitor, some of the inhabitants lower costs by attend-
ing the competitor’s games, so that regional competition may reduce the 
attendance of a given team’s matches. The greater the distance to a com-
petitor, the more people attend a local game, thus ??? ?0. The ticket price 
attendees are willing to pay is given by ?? ? ?????????. The parameter ??? 
captures a regional purchasing power and ??? shows how regional compe-
tition affects the attendees’ utility.  
The ticket price is a result of individual utility maximization. Matches 
against a nearby opponent, i.e., local derbies, are often fierce and intense 
and it is assumed that these matches provide a higher utility level than a 
match of more distant teams. The willingness to pay the price of watching 
a match is assumed to decline in d, thus ???<0. By defining ??? ? ??? ?
?? and ??? ? ??? ? ??, the market of a team is given by: ?? ? ???????. The 
parameter ?? indicates the specifics of a region with regard to the level of 
revenue that may be generated within this region; ?? is intended to repre-
sent the volatility of this revenue for the case that there is another sports 
team nearby. Whether a team’s market increases or decreases in d de-
pends on the sign of ??. With ?? being positive (?? ? ?), the effect on the 
number of stadium attendees is larger than the effect on the price. In this 
case, the market of a team decreases with more regional competition. If 
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the price effect dominates the effect on attendees, a team’s market in-
creases with more regional competition, i.e., ?? ? ?. 
The kind of revenue function, as well as contest success function and cost 
function is standard in sport economics literature.1 However, in the model 
presented here, teams are also able to decide on the degree of regional 
competition, ??, that affects their own market size, as well as that of re-
gional competitors. The degree of regional competition affects profits and 
the marginal products of talent directly via the market size m, as well as 
indirectly via the winning probability and the cost function. 
The decision about the degree of regional competition is modeled in a 
two-stage game. In the first stage, teams choose the degree of regional 
competition, and in the second stage, they determine the amount of talent. 
Since teams are assumed to make rational decisions under perfect infor-
mation, the game can be solved by backward induction. Employing the 
concept of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, the teams decide on the 
optimal degree of regional competition, or the distance to the markets of 
other teams in the league, contingent on their choices of talent. The short-
er the distance d between two adjacent teams, the greater the degree of 
regional competition and vice versa, with no regional competition at all as 
the lower bound. 
 
2.2 Profit maximization 
A well-established approach since Rottenberg (1956) in the sports eco-
nomics literature is to model profit maximization as the objective of teams 
in a sports league. For all choices of regional competition, the Nash equi-
librium for the subgame at the second stage is given by profit maximiza-
tion.  For the solution, the assumption about the kind of talent supply 
emerges as crucial. There are closed and open league models, with the 
former assuming a fixed talent supply and with the latter assuming indefi-
nitely available talent. A fixed supply of talent is the traditional approach 
used since El-Hodiri and Quirk (1971) as well as, for instance, Fort and 
                                        
1  For detailed information about the CSF, see Tullock (1980) and Skaperdas (1996). 
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Quirk (1995). Starting with Szymanski (2004), Szymanski and Kesenne 
(2004) as well as Kesenne (2005), this approach has been criticized. The 
latter authors have stated that it is necessary to take into account non-
cooperative behavior of sport teams by assuming an infinite availability of 
talent. An overview of this discussion can be found in Eckard (2006), as 
well as a game theoretic extension in Madden (2011). However, Winfree 
and Fort (2012) demonstrated that by differentiating between the direct 
decision on talent and the more indirect investment in talent, non-
cooperative behavior may be modeled with a fixed supply of talent. In this 
paper, it is assumed that the supply of highly skilled sports talent is fixed. 
Therefore, one team’s talent gain is a talent loss for the rest of the league.  
Proposition 1: The equilibrium winning probabilities of each team in a 
profit maximization league with fixed talent supply are given by: 
?? ? ? ?? ??? ????
????
??   (2) 
with an total league payroll of: 
?? ? ?? ? ? ?? ?? ??
???? ?
? ????? . (3) 
Proof: The objective of each team is profit maximization, ????? ??; with 
the profit definition in (1), this yields: 
???
???
???
??? ?
???
??? ? ? ?
????? ? ?
? ??????
? ?? ?? ? ?. (4) 
With the adding-up constraint ? ?? ? ?????  and the n first order conditions 
(FOCs) in (4), a set of (n+1) linear equations is obtained for determining 
n winning probabilities and a total league payoff, ?? ? ?????? . The solution 
of this system of equations is straightforward, with the resulting equations 
(2) and (3) above. // 
With marginal revenue equaling marginal cost, the results of Proposition 1 
are common in the sports economics literature; more recent examples in-
clude Vrooman (2007) and Szymanski (2003). Note that the result of 
Proposition 1 relies heavily on the assumption of a fixed supply of talent. 
With this fixed supply, one team’s talent gain is another team’s loss such 
that:  ?? ?????? ????=0, and therefore: ???????=???? ?????? . In an open 
league, the talent choice of one team does not affect the choice of another 
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team directly: ??????? ? ? with ? ? ?, and therefore: ? ? ?????? ???? ? ?. 
Thus, ???????=??? ? ????? ??????  holds in an open league. This results in 
a set of n quadratic first-order conditions and the adding-up constraint. 
Given the assumptions about the revenue function in this paper, this sys-
tem of equations is not explicitly solvable for n>2. 
 
2.3 Win maximization 
Going back to Sloane (1971), the maximization of sporting success, de-
fined as winning percentages, is considered to be a legitimate objective of 
sports teams. With ??????? ? ?? and win maximization as the objective 
of teams, a budget restriction is required to depict teams’ investment be-
havior. In a win-maximization league, teams will invest as much as possi-
ble in talent to increase their winning percentages. A common assumption 
in the literature (see Kesenne, 2007) is to assume a zero-profit condition 
for all teams. Although Fort and Quirk (2004) question this approach, in 
this present paper, the zero-profit condition is applied, as it seems to be an 
obvious necessity, at least in the long run.  
Proposition 2: The winning probabilities of each team in a win-
maximization league are given by: 
?? ? ? ?? ? ????
? ????????
?? ,  (5) 
with a total league payroll of: 
?? ? ?? ? ? ?? ???
? ?????? ?
??
???? . (6) 
Proof: With a zero-profit constraint, teams will invest up to the point 
where profit equal cost, which is equivalent to average profit equaling av-
erage cost. In league equilibrium, the average profits of all teams are 
equalized.  
?? ? ? ? ? ??????? ? ?? ??
?
? ??? ? ??? ? ?????? ? ? ??? ? ?. (7) 
These n reaction functions, together with the adding-up constraint, repre-
sent a set of (n+1) linear equations whose results determine n winning 
probabilities and a total league payoff ?? ? ??????? . // 
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Comparing equations (5) and (2) shows that the winning percentages in a 
win-maximization league are always higher than in a profit maximizing 
league for teams having market sizes above the league average market 
size ? ???????? . The winning percentages of the teams with market sizes 
below the league average are higher in the profit maximization league. 
Comparing equations (6) and (3) demonstrates that a win-maximization 
league also has a higher overall league payroll. The higher competitive 
imbalance, as well as the higher league payroll in the win-maximization 
league, is in accordance with the sports economics literature; for a two 
team league, see Vrooman (2007). 
 
2.4 Basic model with regional competition 
The standard approach in the literature is to assume that there is no re-
gional competition at all, so that the league equilibrium is determined by 
equation (2) or (5), respectively. If the teams know that they can influence 
their own market size, as well as that of others, they become aware of the 
results of individual profit or win maximization in the second stage of the 
game defined here. Therefore, they will anticipate this outcome when they 
choose the degree of regional competition in the first stage of the game.  
Proposition 3: Regardless of the objective of the teams, the decision 
about the degree of regional competition depends only on whether or not 
regional competition increases the team’s winning percentage. Independ-
ent of the teams’ objective, a single team i gains from increased regional 
competition as long as 
 ?????? ?
?
??
???
??
???? . (8) 
Proof: For a profit maximizing team, the subgame perfect Nash equilibri-
um is derived from the first-order conditions: ?? ? ??? ? ?? ? ??????? . In-
serting the first-order conditions into equation (1) and taking account of 
???? ? ??? ? ??????? , equation (1) is reduced to:  
?? ? ? ?? ???? (9) 
Inserting the equilibrium winning percentage of equation (2) into equation 
(9) gives the objective function of a profit-maximizing team in the first 
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stage of the game. A profit-maximizing team profits from regional compe-
tition as long as ?????? ? ?. The derivation of equation (9) with respect to d, 
taking account of ?? ? ? , gives (8). A win-percentage-maximizing team 
is profiting from a decreasing distance if ?????? ? ?, derivation of (5) with 
respect to d gives (8).  // 
Regional competition has an impact on winning probabilities and the total 
league payoff ?? ? ?????? . Independent of the teams’ objectives, in a two 
stage game, the crucial question is whether the teams’ winning probabili-
ties increase or decrease with the distance d. If the change of its own mar-
ket is smaller than the average league market change, a team is better off 
with regional competition. 
To show the basic mechanism of regional competition, an n-team league, 
with ? ? ? and two markets, e and f, are considered, that are sufficiently 
close to each other to allow for regional competition. In this setting, 
?? ? ?? ? ?. The markets of the other teams are not affected by this de-
cisions of team e and f, so that ?????? ? ? for ? ? ?? ?. By defining the 
market elasticity of regional competition ?? ? ? ?????
?
??, and by multiplying 
both sides of (8) by??????? ??, it follows from (8) that team i benefits 
from regional competition if: 
?? ? ?????
?
????? ??. (10) 
The determinants of regional competition are defined by the relative mar-
ket elasticities of regional competition, the relative market sizes and the 
league size. Crucial for the interpretation of the inequality (10) is the de-
rivative ????? ? ????????? ? ???, so that (10) can be written as:  
?? ? ????
??
?? ?
????????.  (11) 
As equation (8) shows, the positive effect of regional competition on rev-
enue can be attributed to the positive effect it could have on the winning 
probabilities of the teams. This of course includes a negative effect on the 
winning percentages of a regional competitor. The more teams in a 
league, the weaker this negative effect will be, which explains why the 
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likelihood that inequality (11) holds decreases in n. The relationship ????? 
on the of inequality (11) shows that the greater the inequality between two 
regions with respect to their revenue potential, the more likely a team i 
gains from regional competition, as long as it is the team with the lower 
revenue potential. Furthermore, not only the absolute effect of regional 
competition on the teams has an impact on the decision as to whether such 
a competition occurs or not, but also the difference between these effects. 
Yet, both effects in inequality (11), the absolute as well as the relative, 
point in the same direction. Hence, the chances that inequality (11) holds 
increases in ?? and decreases in ??. 
If only two teams in a league have the opportunity to enter regional com-
petition, and the other team is unable to avoid it, there are only three pos-
sible combinations of market derivations:  
- the markets of both teams increase with regional competition, 
- the markets of both teams decrease with regional competition, 
- only one team’s market increases, the other’s decreases. 
Table 1 provides an overview of cases where there is regional competition 
in league equilibrium, given that the partial derivatives of market sizes 
with respect to d are constant for all i and unequal to zero for e and f. Un-
der these circumstances, the degree of competition is reduced to a bang-
bang solution: either both teams avoid competition or the highest possible 
degree of competition is realized. Interior solutions are feasible if the as-
sumption of a constant derivative ??? is abandoned. For sake of simplici-
ty, this is not considered here. 
The specifics of a region with regard to regional competition can be de-
fined by ? ? ?????? ?
??
??
??
?? ?
?????. The parameter ? consists of the relative 
revenue potential and the relative effects of regional competition, as well 
as the distance between the teams. To find the team which gains from re-
gional competition, three different characteristics of ? have to be consid-
ered; ? can be inside the open interval ? ???? ? ? ? ??  or outside it on both 
sides. Notice that the lower bound decreases in n whereas the upper bound 
increases in n; therefore, the interval increases in n. The more teams a 
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league hosts, the better the chances that ? is within this interval. Under the 
assumption that ??? and ??? are unequal to zero, all possible constella-
tions are shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Best-responses of the teams regarding regional competition 
Assumption 
about ??? , 
???  
Possible relation of 
? 
Best-response func-
tion of the teams 
Regional 
competition 
??? ? ? 
 
 
??? ? ? 
? ? ? ? ? ????? ? ??
???
?? ? ? yes ?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
???
?? ? ??
???
?? ? ?  
? ? ?? ? ? 
???
?? ? ??
???
?? ? ? yes 
??? ? ? 
 
 
??? ? ? 
? ? ? ? ? ????? ? ??
???
?? ? ? yes ?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
???
?? ? ??
???
?? ? ? yes 
? ? ?? ? ? 
???
?? ? ??
???
?? ? ? yes 
??? ? ? 
??? ? ? ? ?
?
? ? ? 
???
?? ? ??
???
?? ? ? yes 
??? ? ? 
??? ? ? ? ?
?
? ? ? 
???
?? ? ??
???
?? ? ? yes 
 
As mentioned above, crucial for the sign of the ??? is the sign of ??, which 
captures the effect of regional competition. The market for a team de-
creases with higher regional competition, if the effect of a higher willing-
ness to pay is smaller than the effect on attendance. If the former is greater 
than the latter, then the opposite is true. The higher the absolute value of 
??, the more sensitively the team’s market reacts to regional competition.  
With two teams in a n-team league deciding about regional competition 
and both teams’ markets decreasing with regional competition, one team 
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nevertheless benefits as long as ? is not in the abovementioned interval 
defined by the league size. Only if it is within the interval both teams are 
better off avoiding regional competition. If ? is outside the interval, the 
team with the less sensitive market gains from regional competition; the 
team with the more sensitive, and in this case decreasing market, has re-
duced profits. Thus, even if the effect on its own market is negative, but 
comparatively small, a team could enter regional competition if this has a 
strong negative effect on an opponent. The gaining team loses attendance, 
which is not fully offset by an increasing price, although this is in the end 
offset by higher profits due to an increased winning probability. Even 
though a team reduces its own market, if it is able to reduce the market of 
another team even more, it could still gain from regional competition. If 
the markets of both teams decrease in d, there will be regional competition 
at the league equilibrium. However, only if ? is inside the interval 
? ???? ? ? ? ??, do both teams benefit from this competition. If ? is outside 
the interval, the team with the more sensitive market will be the benefi-
ciary of regional competition and the other team will be worse off. The 
latter team’s market increases with regional competition, but the former 
market increases so much more that it ends up with lower winning per-
centage and lower profits. Even a team’s market which increases with re-
gional competition, does not necessarily imply increasing profits, as re-
gional competition has an effect on talent allocation and competitive bal-
ance. Hence, whenever there is a business expansion effect for one team, 
and a business-stealing effect for another team, regional competition will 
occur in a sport league. If ?? and ?? have opposing signs, only one team’s 
market increases, while the other teams market decreases in regional 
competition. These cases are straightforward, as the team with the increas-
ing market always gains from regional competition. 
 
2.5 Competitive balance, league outcome and regional competi-
tion 
As shown above, regional competition influences the talent allocation in a 
league. As it then affects the winning probability of each team, the analy-
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sis of competitive balance requires an appropriate measure of talent ine-
quality. To measure the degree of competitive balance in a league, one 
option is to use concentration ratios of talent allocation. Several different 
measures of concentration have been applied in sports economics. One 
well known measure is the Gini coefficient used by Schmidt and Berri 
(2001; 2002) or Utt and Fort (2002); another one is the relative entropy of 
Horrowitz (1997). Without further assumptions about the market sizes m 
and their ascending or descending ordering, the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHI) is a useful and appropriate measure of talent concentration in 
a league (see, e.g., Depken, 1999; Owen et al., 2007). In a sport league 
context, the HHI is defined as the sum of the squares of the talent shares 
of teams: 
??? ? ?? ? ??? ?????? ?
?
? ? ??????????? . (12) 
The higher the HHI, the greater the competitive imbalance in a league, 
with a maximum of 1; the lower the HHI, the more even the distribution 
of talent, with a completely balanced talent allocation at ??? ? ???. The 
influence of regional competition on competitive balance is analyzed by 
focusing again on the regional competition decision of teams e and f. 
Proposition 4: Independent of the assumptions about team objectives and 
for a fixed as well as a flexible supply of talent, regional competition im-
proves competitive balance if: 
???
?? ??? ? ? ?? ?
???
?? ??? ? ? ?? ? ?. (13) 
Proof: Regional competition improves competitive balance as long as 
???????? ? ? holds. Derive (12) with respect to d, considering the add-
ing up constraint and ?? ? ? ? gives (13). // 
The terms ??? ? ? ??? ??? ? ? ?? are positive or negative whenever the 
talent levels of e and f, respectively, are above or below the average level 
of talent in the league. Whether regional competition improves or worsens 
the competitive balance of a league depends to some extent on the exact 
values of the league parameters.  
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If both teams e and f have talent levels above the league average, competi-
tive balance will improve if their markets decline with regional competi-
tion and it will deteriorate if their markets increase with regional competi-
tion. With e (f) being the team whose market decreases (increases) in d, 
competitive balance improves as long as ????
??
?? ?
????? ? ? ?? ????? ??? ; other-
wise competitive balance would deteriorate.  
If both teams have talent levels below the league average, competitive 
balance will improve if their markets increase with regional competition 
or it will deteriorate if they decrease with regional competition. With e (f) 
being the team whose market decreases (increases) in d, competitive bal-
ance improves as long as ????
??
?? ?
????? ? ? ?? ????? ???; otherwise regional 
competition would worsen the competitive balance of the league. 
If one team has a talent level above and the other team a talent level below 
the league average, the competitive balance will improve if the original 
market declines in size and the latter market increases in terms of regional 
competition; if it is the other way around, the opposite holds. If team e (f) 
has a talent level above (below) the league average and both markets are 
increasing in d, regional competition improves the competitive balance as 
long as ????
??
?? ?
????? ? ? ?? ????? ???. If both markets decrease with regional 
competition, the league has a higher competitive balance if ????
??
?? ?
????? ?
??? ????? ???. 
Apart from total league competitive balance, an interesting effect of re-
gional competition is the possibility to change the orderings of teams with 
respect to their relative talent. A standard finding presented in the litera-
ture is that teams with a larger market earn higher marginal revenue and 
therefore employ a larger amount of talent. Furthermore as equation (2) 
shows, a larger market indeed means a higher winning probability. But in 
contrast, equation (8) shows the negative impact a larger market could 
have. With a larger market, it also becomes more likely that a competitor 
might enter the region. Given the parameters of a league and relative mar-
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ket sizes, a league is not only composed of teams from regions where the 
teams are natural monopolies, but also of larger regions where the teams 
compete for markets. With d* as the distance without regional competi-
tion and d** as the distance with regional competition, a team i from a 
region will end up with less employed talent after the entrance of a com-
petitor j, as long as  ???? ?? ? ???? ??? ? ???? ????? ?? ? ???? ????. 
Hence, the strict relationship between market size and success in a sport 
league does not apply to regions that are large enough to allow for region-
al competition.  
 
2.6 Revenue sharing and regional competition 
In sport leagues, teams sometimes agree (or are forced) to participate in 
some form of revenue sharing. The common justification for this is to im-
prove the competitive balance. There is an extensive debate in the litera-
ture about the effectiveness of revenue sharing agreements on talent allo-
cation. The so-called invariance principle, stated by Rottenberg (1956) 
and first formalized and proven by El-Hodiri and Quirk (1971), implies 
that revenue sharing does not have an impact on talent allocation among 
teams. Winfree and Fort (2012) stated that revenue sharing agreements are 
ineffective in the basic model, if equilibrium in the talent investment mar-
ket equates the marginal product of talent investment across owners (see 
Runkel, 2011, for a comprehensive analysis of the influence of the respec-
tive CSF and talent supply on the effects of revenue sharing). However, 
this result depends to a large extent on the assumptions about team objec-
tives and talent supply, as the authors note themselves. Assuming profit 
maximizing teams with a fixed supply of talent, several papers (e.g. Szy-
manski, 2003; Vrooman, 1995) showed that revenue sharing does not af-
fect talent allocation. Fort and Quirk (1995) demonstrated that if teams 
earn additional revenue that is not shared, the invariance principle does 
not hold. Furthermore, it does not hold if the supply of talent is complete-
ly elastic (Szymanski and Kesenne, 2004; Kesenne, 2005) or if absolute 
rather than relative talent levels matter for team revenue (Kesanne, 2000). 
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Moreover, when teams behave as win-percentage maximizers, it does not 
hold either, as shown in Kesenne (2006) and Vrooman (2008).  
Whether or not the invariance principle holds, depends on modeling as-
sumptions and specifications (revenue function, talent supply, contest 
success function and owners’ objectives). As shown above, regional com-
petition operates through its effect on the winning probabilities of teams. 
Therefore, whenever revenue sharing has an influence on talent allocation, 
it also effects the regional competition of teams. The model specifications 
of this paper allow only for the specified analysis of an n=2 profit maxi-
mization league with a fixed supply of talent.2 Fort and Quirk (2007) 
proved, for a more general model (but with a different CSF), the existence 
and uniqueness of revenue sharing equilibria for n>2. Nevertheless, in 
this paper, n=2 is sufficient to show the effect of revenue sharing, in 
combination with regional competition, even in a closed talent market 
with profit-maximizing teams. The usual expectation in this case is that 
revenue sharing is not effective concerning talent allocation.  
There are several forms of revenue sharing (see, e.g., Vrooman, 2007); in 
this paper, a pool revenue sharing system is applied. Each team keeps a 
share ? of its generated revenues, with the remaining share being used to 
fund a pool of money which is divided equally among all teams.  
The profit of a team i is given by: 
?? ? ????? ?????? ?? ??? ? ???????? . (14) 
Proposition 5: The relative allocation of talent in a ? ? ? profit maximi-
zation league with a closed talent market in the second stage of the game 
is independent of the revenue-sharing parameter ?, because the winning 
percentages are given by: 
?? ? ? ? ???????? . (15) 
In contrast, the overall league payroll, as well the teams’ profits depend 
on ?: 
????? ? ??? ? ? ??????????? , (16) 
                                        
2  See Appendix for detailed information. 
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?? ? ? ???????
??????????????????????????
?? . (17) 
Proof: Both teams maximize their profit function (14) in the second stage 
of the league game by choosing their respective talent level. At equilibri-
um, marginal revenues are equal: 
?? ??????
???
??? ?
???
? ?
???
???
???
??? ?
???
???
???
??? ? ? ??
???
???
???
??? ?
???
? ?
???
???
???
??? ?
???
???
???
??? ?. (18) 
With ??????? ? ????????? ? ????, equation (16) is reduced to: 
??????? ? ???????. In combination with the adding-up constraint, this 
yields equation (15). Inserting equation (15) into equation (14), taking ac-
count of ???? ? ?????? ? ???, yields equations (16) and (17). // 
In this model, revenue sharing does not directly affect the talent allocation 
within the league in the second stage of the league game. For ? ? ?, equa-
tion (15) equals equation (2), which is a standard result in the literature 
(see, e.g., Vrooman, 2007). However, revenue sharing has an effect on the 
profits of teams. This effect in turn impacts on the degree of regional 
competition chosen in the first stage of the game; regional competition 
then has an influence on the competitive balance of the league. 
Proposition 6: In a two-team league, team i is profiting from regional 
competition with revenue sharing if: 
?? ? ????? ?
?????????????
??????? ? ??. (19) 
Proof: Differentiating equation (17) with respect to d and expanding the 
result with ???????? yields (19). Note that ?? ??? ? ? must be larger 
than zero, since this expression is the numerator of the winning probabil-
ity according to equation (15). // 
By defining ????? ? ???????????????????? , inequality (19) can be written as: 
?? ? ???? ????. (20) 
The revenue sharing parameter ? has an influence on the degree of com-
petitive balance, as ?? ? ? depends on?? and ?????? ? ??. Hence ?? de-
creases with an increasing level of revenue sharing. With no revenue shar-
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ing, i.e., ? ? ?, equation (19) is equal to equation (10) for ? ? ?. As 
?? ? ?? ? ? is the numerator of the winning probability in equation (3), 
it is larger than zero. Given the parameters ??? ??? ??? ??, the probability that 
inequality (12) holds, decreases for both teams with a higher level of rev-
enue sharing. Hence, regional competition is less likely to occur in a 
league with revenue sharing than in one without sharing. Table 2 provides 
an overview of cases with regional competition under revenue sharing. 
Without revenue sharing, there is only one parameter combination for 
which no regional competition occurs (see Table 1). With revenue shar-
ing, it becomes more likely that all teams are better off by avoiding re-
gional competition. Revenue sharing makes this one case not only more 
likely, in addition, with different signs of market elasticity, revenue shar-
ing effectively creates the possibility that no team prefers regional compe-
tition. If both teams can increase their market through regional competi-
tion, revenue sharing also increases the possibility that both teams can in-
crease their profits.  
Although revenue sharing does not affect competitive balance in a profit-
maximizing closed league, in the second stage of the game, it nonetheless 
changes the teams’ profits. Thus revenue sharing has an effect on the loca-
tion choice of the teams, which therefore has an effect on the talent alloca-
tion. Teams gain from regional competition to some extent, because of the 
business-stealing effect. However, if their opponent’s revenues is part of 
their own profits, business-stealing may reduce these profits, such that 
thus revenue sharing may decrease the level of regional competition. As a 
consequence, even in a league where revenue sharing is not directly effec-
tive, it can nevertheless have an indirect effect on talent allocation, if the 
teams can choose their own location. If revenue sharing has an impact on 
the location choice, talent allocation may differ between a league with 
revenue sharing and one without it. 
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Table 2 Best-responses of the teams regarding regional competition in 
cases of revenue sharing 
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Table 2 Best-responses of the teams regarding regional competition in 
cases of revenue sharing 
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3 Regional origin of most successful European football 
teams  
Determining the right current or potential market sizes of sports teams has 
been discussed extensively in the empirical literature. In this paper, the 
approach of Schmidt and Berri (2001) is adopted to approximate the mar-
ket size of sports teams using the size of the local population. However, 
teams from less crowded areas could nevertheless be successful, as long 
as they have strong support from firms, such as VfL Wolfsburg 
(Volkswagen) in Germany and FC Sochoux (Peugeot) in France. Moreo-
ver, defining the right catchment area provides an additional challenge. 
With the population of a city or region as a proxy for market size, this 
might be overestimated or underestimated. Buraimo et al. (2007) proposed 
the population in different areas near a stadium, as well as the de-
mographics and years of league membership, as proxies for market size. 
Additionally the preferences of residents for sport, as well as income lev-
els might differ between regions. In this paper, local population is used in 
this manner to provide an approximate empirical analysis. 
According to sport economics, it is probable that the largest European cit-
ies host the most successful European football teams, because they own 
the largest markets. To verify this, in Table 3, the all-time league records 
of the best teams of six major European football leagues are depicted. The 
ten most successful teams in terms of aggregated wins in the respective 
leagues are presented, along with the cities (ranked by population size), 
where the clubs are located. If more than one club was hosted by the same 
city, the arithmetic mean of the corresponding ranks is attributed to the 
respective clubs. The reported value of Kendall’s tau presents the rank-
correlation between success in the respective league and the size of the 
teams’ host city, i.e., the size of their home market.  
With a tau value of 0.705, the Scottish Premier League has by far the 
highest correlation between city size and team success. On the other hand, 
in France, with a tau value of 0.111, there is almost no correlation at all 
between team success and host city size.  
72 Regional Competition in Sports Leagues 
 
 
Table 3: All-time most successful teams in six European football leagues 
 
 
Primera Division Rank 
of the 
City 
Seria A Rank 
of the 
City 
1 Real Madrid C.F.  1.5 1 Juventus F.C. 6.5 
2 FC Barcelona 3.5 2 F.C. Internationale Milano 3.5 
3 Athletic Bilbao 9 3 A.C. Milan 3.5 
4 Atletico Madrid 1.5 4 A.S. Roma 1.5 
5 Valencia C.F. 4 5 ACF Fiorentina 10 
6 RCD Espanyol 3.5 6 Torino F.C. 6.5 
7 Sevilla F.C. 5.5 7 Lazio Roma 1.5 
8 Real Sociedad 10 8 Bologna F.C. 1909 9 
9 Real Zaragoza 8 9 S.S.C. Napoli 5 
10 Real Betis 5.5 10 U.C. Sampdoria 8 
τ = 0.469 τ  = 0.138 
Fußball Bundesliga Rank 
of the 
City 
Scottish Premier League Rank 
of the 
City 
1 FC Bayern Munich 2 1 Celtic F.C. 1.5 
2 SV Werder Bremen 7 2 Rangers F.C. 1.5 
3 Hamburger SV 1 3 Heart of Midlothian F.C. 3.5 
4 VfB Stuttgart 5 4 Aberdeen F.C. 5 
5 Borussia Dortmund 6 5 Hibernian F.C. 3.5 
6 Borussia Mön-
chengladbach 
9 6 Kilmarnock F.C. 10 
7 1. FC Köln 3 7 Dundee United F.C. 6 
8 1. FC Kaiserslautern 10 8 Motherwell F.C. 8 
9 FC Schalke 04 8 9 Inverness Caledonian Thistle 
F.C. 
7 
10 Eintracht Frankfurt 4 10 Dunfermline Athletic F.C. 9 
τ  = 0.2889 τ  = 0.705 
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Table 3: All-time most successful teams in six European football leagues 
Source: fussballdaten.de (2011), cities are ranked according their popula-
tion size. 
 
With exception of France and Germany, the largest regions in terms of 
inhabitants of all countries considered here are represented in the all-time-
best list of football teams. Furthermore, in four of the six leagues, again 
with the exception of France and Germany, some of these regions have 
more than one club among the all-time best teams. Evidently, market size 
matters, at least to some extent. Nevertheless, only in half of the leagues, 
do the most successful clubs come from the largest region. In Italy, the 
most successful club is hosted by the city of Torino (Turin), which is rela-
tively small compared to Rome. The most successful teams in England are 
not from London, just as the best French teams are not from Paris, alt-
hough London and Paris are by far the largest cities of their countries with 
Premier League Rank 
of the 
City 
Lique 1 Rank 
of the 
City 
1 Liverpool F.C. 5.5 1 Olympique de Marseille 1 
2 Everton F.C. 5.5 2 FC Girondins de 
Bordeaux 
5 
3 Arsenal F.C. 2 3 AS Saint-Étienne 6 
4 Manchester United F.C. 7.5 4 AS Monaco 9 
5 Aston Villa F.C. 4 5 FC Sochaux-
Montbéliard 
10 
6 Manchester City F.C. 7.5 6 Olympique Lyonnais 2 
7 Newcastle United F.C. 9 7 RC Lens 8 
8 Tottenham Hotspur F.C. 2 8 FC Nantes 3 
9 Chelsea F.C. 2 9 FC Metz 7 
10 Sunderland A.F.C. 10 10 RC Strasbourg 4 
τ  = 0.141 τ  = 0.111 
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respect to population size. However, three of the ten most successful 
teams in England come from London.  
 
Table 4: Regional competition in the German Bundesliga 
Metropolitan Region 
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Rhine-Ruhr 11.69 14 5 11 0.942 
Central Germany 6.90 2 0 0 0 
Berlin/Brandenburg 5.95 5 0 0 0 
Rhine-Main 5.52 4 2 0 0 
Stuttgart 5.29 2 1 3 0.567 
Munich 5.60 3 1 22 3.93 
Hamburg 4.29 2 2 3 0.700 
Hanover-
Braunschweig-
Göttingen-Wolfsburg 
3.88 3 2 2 0.515 
Nuremberg 3.60 1 1 1 0.278 
Bremen-Oldenburg 2.73 1 1 4 1.470 
Rhine-Neckar 2.36 3 1  0 
Rest  10 2 2  
Share of the Metro-
politan Regions  0.80 0.89 0.96  
Source: IKM (2010), bundesliga.de (2011). 
 
The previous findings are emphasized by results for the first three German 
football league divisions in the season 2009/2010. The cities are ranked 
by population size, whereby all German cities were considered, not only 
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those with a professional football team. The correlation of ranks of the top 
three division teams with the population size ranks of cities, yields a Ken-
dall tau of 0.195. 
Table 4 shows the competition across regions in the German football 
(soccer) Bundesliga. Of all the clubs that ever played in the Bundesliga, 
80 percent came from one of the 11 German metropolitan areas, which 
are the largest population agglomerations in Germany. In the season 
2009/2010, only two clubs were not located in these regions. All champi-
ons came from one of these regions, except one, namely 1. FC Kaiserslau-
tern, a two-time winner of the national football championship.  
These empirical findings support the hypothesis that a large market does 
not necessarily imply also having one of the best performing teams. By far 
the most crowded area in Germany is the Rhine-Ruhr area, with nearly 12 
million inhabitants, and indeed, the majority of clubs in the Bundesliga 
are located in this region. But in comparison with the region of Munich in 
Bavaria, the Ruhr area is not that successful. Although the Ruhr area has a 
population size more than twice that of Munich, teams from the Ruhr area 
have won only half as many titles. Some large areas like Berlin or Frank-
furt did not produce a single national champion, whereas the much small-
er Bremen area supported a team that won the national championship four 
times. To some extent, this is the consequence of regional competition. 
Larger regions seem to trigger stronger local competition, whereas in 
smaller regions, the focus of support is on just one club.  
Table 5 presents the results of an OLS-regression, providing evidence of 
the negative effect of local competition on the number of years a team is 
able to stay in the highest division of the German football league. The de-
pendent variable is the number of years a club has been in the Bundesliga. 
The independent variables are the sum of years when one or more addi-
tional teams within a radius of 50 km also played in the Bundesliga, and 
the population size of the catchment area. To approximate the catchment 
area of a team, the inhabitants per metropolitan area, or of an area of 
comparable size, are used. Teams remained longer in the German Bun-
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desliga, the larger their catchment area and the fewer the number of near-
by opponents. All estimated coefficients are statistically significant at the 
5% level. These results provide provisional empirical evidence of the ef-
fects of regional competition on success. 
 
Table 5: Regional competition and time in the German Bundesliga 
Dependent variable years in Bundesliga 
Independent variable Coefficient 
C 8.764** 
Sum of years of competitors in BL. -0.107** 
Size of catchment area (in million in-
habitants) 
2.650** 
F-Statistic 3.418** 
Adjusted R-squared 0.090 
*** 1% level of significance, ** 5% level, * 10% level. 
Source: Own estimation based on data from bundesliga.de (2011). 
 
4 Conclusion 
A top sports league is a highly competitive environment and, since poten-
tial revenue is different in different locations, talent allocation will also 
differ between teams. However, teams do not necessarily remain in one 
place. Either teams or talent can change their location. This has an effect 
on the revenue potential of other clubs through a business-stealing or a 
business-expansion effect. A regional reallocation of teams or talent is 
thus accompanied by a change in talent allocation between the teams.  
In this paper, a model of regional competition is presented. In a two stage 
game, it is shown that, independent of the objectives of teams, regional 
competition will occur if it increases the winning probability of at least 
one team. Teams might choose to compete with one another, due to an 
increased own winning probability or to lower the winning probability of 
another team. Whether regional competition enhances the league’s com-
petitive balance cannot be stated with certainty, but it is evident that a 
large-market team might end up with less talent than it would employ 
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without regional competition. A strict relationship between market size 
and success in sports leagues does therefore not hold. The reason is that 
large regions attract more teams than smaller ones. Therefore small-
market teams might be more successful, as they do not face local competi-
tion over their market.  
Furthermore, it can be shown that revenue sharing, although not directly 
effective in the reallocation of talent, nevertheless has an effect on talent 
allocation, as it prevents the occurrence of regional competition, at least to 
some extent. Revenue sharing, may evidently internalize some of the neg-
ative externalities of regional competition. For major European football 
(soccer) leagues, as well as for the German Bundesliga, empirical evi-
dence is presented that regional competition exists and exerts a negative 
impact on the winning probabilities of teams within the respective region.  
Further empirical research is required to expand this initial empirical 
analysis by providing an appropriate definition and measurement of mar-
ket size for sport teams. The number of inhabitants, as well as regional 
income, regional economic growth and regional preferences for football in 
general might be appropriate measures. Also, the role of team-specific 
preferences of inhabitants of a region could be taken into account more 
specifically. Another topic for future research entails the effects of supra-
national tournaments and their influence on the regional competition of 
teams.  
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Appendix 
Profit maximization, Revenue sharing, fixed talent supply with n>2 
The allocation of talent is a result of individual profit maximization. With 
marginal revenues equaling marginal costs of n teams we obtain a set of n 
first order conditions. The sum of all winning probabilities is unity 
? ?? ? ?????  and in a closed league n equations stating that one teams gain 
of talent is everybody else loss of talent ?? ??????? ????? ? ?. With reve-
nue sharing the variables needed to be determined by this system are n 
winning probabilities, the marginal costs c of the league and, with n teams 
and ??????? ? ?  given, n*(n-1) partial derivations ??????? for ? ?
?? ? ? ? ? ?. Thus a set of ?? ? ? equations should determine ? ?
??? ? ?? ? ? ? ?? ? ?? variables, which is only possible for?? ? ?. This 
follows from the fact, that with every additional new team 5 new variables 
have to be determined but only two new equations are obtained. Therefore 
for n>2 the equation system is underdetermined. One possibility to solve 
this set of equations is to make assumptions about the partial derivations 
???????; e.g. Kesenne (2000) solved this problem by assuming that every 
team takes the equal share of talent loss of one teams talent gain, but each 
other assumption seems to be equally reasonable. 
 
Profit maximization, Revenue sharing, flexible talent supply with n>2 – 
win maximization 
In an open league the partial derivations are all determined with ??????? ?
?and ??????? ? ? for all ? ? ? but with ? ? ? the system of equations be-
comes quadratic and cannot be solved explicitly. With the average reve-
nues being the best-response function of the teams, we also obtain a set of 
equations which explicit solution cannot be given. 
 
 

 
5 Vector Similarity as a New Measure of Dynamic 
Competitive Balance in Sports Leagues 
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Abstract: A new measure of competitive balance in sport leagues is pro-
posed, based on a vector approach to measuring similarity. The standard 
measures, such as, the win percentage standard deviation ratio, consider 
the inequality per season only. Analyzing the inequality of a competition 
over time requires a different approach. The measure proposed here is 
well suited to determining the dynamic competitive balance of a league. 
As the application on the German Bundesliga indicates, the new measure 
is a useful complement to the existing measures of competitive balance 
and should enhance the analysis of outcome uncertainty in sports leagues. 
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1 Introduction 
The demand for sporting events is closely associated with the uncertainty 
of outcome. The underlying assumption is that predetermined sport con-
tests are uninteresting for viewers. However, analyzing the uncertainty of 
outcome hypothesis in a sport league is challenging, due to the many di-
mensions of uncertainty. In a sport league, one aspect of uncertainty is the 
outcome of a single match, yet another is the outcome of the whole sea-
son. Over time, some teams are more successful than others, so that the 
degree of unbalance of an entire season is an incomplete measure of com-
petitive balance and outcome uncertainty.  
As there is considerable variety in the interpretation of the uncertainty of 
outcome hypothesis, there are a number of different measures for captur-
ing the various effects. The methods employed so far to measure the ine-
quality of season outcomes do not consider changes in relative standings 
of the teams, or are unable to display the composition changes in a league 
over time, due to a promotion and relegation system. Therefore the contri-
bution of this paper to the existing literature is to propose an indicator that 
determines the similarity of consecutive seasons, by measuring a season’s 
outcome through a vector of team ranking, where the similarity of con-
secutive vectors is determined mathematically by the angle between them. 
A higher level of vector similarity implies less volatility in relative team 
standings, with a higher degree of predetermination of a league’s seasonal 
outcome and, therefore, a lower degree of competitive balance.  
The basic idea of outcome uncertainty in sport economics is so essential 
for every sporting contest, that the efforts devoted in the empirical litera-
ture to finding evidence of a clear connection between outcome uncertain-
ty and the demand for sport events is hardly surprising. That a sport com-
petition needs at least some degree of balance in order to be interesting for 
spectators has been well established in the economics literature since Rot-
tenberg (1956) and Neale (1964). More recently, Szymanski (2003) dis-
tinguished between three dimensions of outcome uncertainty: (1) uncer-
tainty of outcome concerning a single match, (2) uncertainty of seasonal 
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outcomes and (3) uncertainty of consecutive seasons. In sharp contrast to 
the effort devoted to measuring outcome uncertainty, Borland and Mac-
donald (2003) found, in their review of the empirical literature, only 
mixed evidence of the relevance of outcome uncertainty. They conclude 
that if there is any relationship at all between outcome uncertainty and 
demand for sport, only seasonal and championship uncertainty matters, 
whereas there does not seem to be an influence of match uncertainty on 
overall demand. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. A brief overview of the 
most commonly used measures of seasonal and championship uncertainty 
is presented in Section 2. In Section 3, a new method for measuring the 
similarity of consecutive seasons is presented. This method is applied to 
the point distribution, as well as to the rankings of seasons, so as to cap-
ture outcome uncertainty resulting from changes in relative team stand-
ings in a league. In Section 4, the measurement method is applied to de-
termine the level of outcome uncertainty in the German Bundesliga. Addi-
tionally, the new index is compared with the well-known indices present-
ed in the second section. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2 Measures of outcome uncertainty 
In order to measure seasonal outcome uncertainty, the standard deviation 
of winning percentages in a particular season is frequently used. The 
standard deviation may be set in relation to that of a totally unbalanced 
league (Gossens, 2006). However, comparison with an ideally balanced 
league is more common and was first suggested by Noll (1988) and ap-
plied by Scully (1989). They compared the actual outcome of a league 
with an idealized standard error of a league with a maximum degree of 
competitive balance. Quirk and Fort (1992) argued that a totally balanced 
league has n equally strong teams and each team has a fifty-fifty probabil-
ity of winning each match they play. With g matches, the standard devia-
tion of an ideally competitively balanced league would be ??? ??? . The 
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major leagues in European football are double round-robin tournaments; 
thus, the standard deviation of a perfectly balanced league 
is???? ???? ? ??? . The more teams in a league, the lower this idealized 
standard deviation of the league.  
The spread around the average of wins in a league is an intuitive method 
of measuring the competitive balance of one season, but it is an inappro-
priate measure of the changes in competitive balance over time or of out-
come uncertainty from changes in relative team rankings, because it treats 
teams anonymously. With n teams in a league, where a win is awarded w 
points and a tie t points and the teams play against each other twice, the 
maximum number of points per season is reached when a team is a winner 
in each game, i.e., the whole league has a sum of 2n(n-1)w points. If each 
game ends in a tie, the minimum number of points per season for a league 
is given by 4n(n-1)t. As long as a win is rewarded with twice as many 
points as a tie, the absolute number of points is fixed for the league. How-
ever, with the introduction of the three-point system in European football, 
the absolute number of points awarded to the teams per season is no long-
er fixed. Therefore, the standard deviation cannot be used to compare the 
competitive balance over different seasons within the same league.  
To analyze the dissimilarity of distributions, several measures are com-
monly used in economics. One of the best-known tools is the Gini coeffi-
cient, which was applied, for instance by Schmidt and Berri (2001, 2002) 
to determine the competitive balance in baseball. Since it is impossible for 
one team to win all games played in the league, Utt and Fort (2002) ad-
justed the Gini coefficient for an ideal unbalanced league. They showed 
that the unadjusted Gini coefficient overestimates competitive balance. 
Further criticism of the Gini coefficient by Utt and Fort (2002), like an 
unbalanced schedule, are not relevant for the major European football 
leagues, as each team plays against any other team in the league twice. 
Other measures of inequality or concentration are, for instance, the Her-
findahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), applied by Depken (1999) and Owen et 
al. (2007), and relative entropy (Horowitz 1997). 
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The standard deviation approach, as well as the other inequality measures 
mentioned so far, determines the inequality of the point distribution of one 
season. Considering just the rank of the teams, with n teams in a league, 
there are n! possible team rankings in a league with the same inequality of 
point distribution. These inequality measures do not consider that changes 
in the relative team rankings matter for competitive balance. Even if a 
league is unbalanced according to the abovementioned measures, it may 
nevertheless be competitively balanced between seasons if relative team 
rankings change from season to season.  
Sport viewers may not only be interested in whether a season was bal-
anced, but also in whether the same teams always win. Even if their sup-
ported team failed in one season, viewers may still be interested in the 
team, as long as they hope that it might succeed in the future. Two sea-
sons can have the same unequal outcome in terms of the standard devia-
tion of winning percentages, and at the same time differ drastically in 
terms of relative team standings. One of the first researchers to address 
this issue was Humphreys (2002). He introduced the competitive balance 
ratio (CBR) as an extension to the standard deviation approach. He also 
used the standard deviation winning percentages of one season, but in ad-
dition the standard deviation over several seasons per team. The CBR is 
appropriate for displaying the abovementioned outcome uncertainty due 
to rank volatility. Nonetheless, the application to European football 
leagues remains problematic. Because of the widely used system of pro-
motion and relegation, it is not possible to calculate the standard deviation 
for every team, as some are replaced over the seasons. Furthermore, as 
indicated above, the results are biased by the three-point-rule and the 
moving point average of leagues. With games ending in ties, the standard 
deviation measures may change without affecting the league rankings. 
Moreover, to calculate team-specific win variations and the winning per-
centages ratio, it is necessary to select a number of seasons to construct 
subsamples and the CBR. Without further studies of the determinants of 
viewer demand, the choice of length of these subsamples will remain arbi-
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trary. For a league which uses a two-point system (2 points for a win, 1 
point for a tie), or a league system in which only wins are counted (with-
out the possibility of a tie), the CBR is an appropriate measure of dynamic 
competitive balance, as long as the league is closed. These limitations 
show that the CBR may be applied to North American sport leagues, alt-
hough some problems, such as unbalanced game schedules and play-offs, 
still persist.  
Lenten (2009) constructed a measure to capture the mobility of teams over 
time, based on a winning percentage average and the gap to an ideal com-
petitive balanced league, but again, the application to European football 
remains problematic, due to the moving average of overall league points 
resulting from the three-point-system. Rank correlation coefficients like 
Kendall’s Tau (Grott, 2008), or Spearman’s rho (e.g. Maxcy and Mondel-
lo, 2006, or Andreff and Raballand, 2009), are not appropriate for measur-
ing the overall similarity of seasonal rankings, as they are not applicable 
to point distributions. Moreover, the promotion and relegation system 
again complicates the application to European football leagues.  
Championship uncertainty is another dimension of outcome uncertainty. 
The more balanced a league, the more teams are potential winners of the 
championship. The distribution of championships is then analyzed by 
simply counting championships or using inequality measures for champi-
onships as in Quirk and Fort (1992). This approach might be useful for 
American sport leagues, where a championship is the only title that can be 
won. The competition in European football leagues is such that it is not 
only about national championships. Teams also compete to gain the right 
to participate in a European competition in the next season. Buzzacchi et 
al. (2003) compared the number of different teams in the top positions of 
leagues with outcomes suspected for a totally balanced league. Compared 
to the short-term outcome uncertainty proposed in this paper, this is a dy-
namic measure showing the long-term outcome uncertainty of a league. 
Moreover, in addition to the suspense resulting from the race to the top 
positions, the usual relegation system creates additional spectator interest 
in the bottom of the league. For teams that know they will not achieve top 
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positions, the mere avoidance of relegation might be considered a success. 
In European football leagues, there are hardly any positions in the ranking 
where spectators and fans find the competition boring. Even teams in the 
midfield can fight for a surprising slight shift towards the top and the right 
to play a supranational tournament next season, just as they should be 
prepared to struggle against relegation. These multi-dimensional aspects 
of outcome uncertainty in European football leagues have not yet been 
reflected in the sport economics literature. Accordingly in this paper, a 
new measure of league volatility is proposed that can capture more of 
these aspects. Manasis et al. (2013) describe European football as a three-
level tournament (Championship title, European tournament, Relegation) 
and developed a concentration ratio for all three tournaments within a sea-
son. The new measure in this paper contains all positions in a league’s 
ranking system. As long as there is sufficient variability in the relative 
standing of teams from season to season, a sport league might be per-
ceived as balanced, although the abovementioned static methods would 
yield different conclusions. In contrast to other measures of dynamic 
competitive balance, the proposed season similarity index does not treat 
teams anonymously. Furthermore, the measure is applicable for every 
point system regime, as well as for leagues with promotion and relegation 
systems. 
 
3 Season-to-season similarity 
The competitive balance of a league does not depend exclusively on the 
inequality of outcome in one season; the degree of change from season to 
season exerts an additional affect. More changes from season to season 
indicate a higher degree of unpredictability of seasonal outcome or a 
higher level of uncertainty, whereas a higher degree of similarity of sea-
sons signals a lower level of competitive balance. In the following analy-
sis, a measure of changes between seasons (i.e., the similarity of consecu-
tive seasons) is proposed, based on a vector angle concept, sometimes re-
ferred to as the cosine measure, e.g. Jones and Furnas (1987); Busch 
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(1998).1 In terms of this concept, the outcome of each season is interpret-
ed as a vector, whose dimension is given by the number n of teams 
i=1,..,n in a league. Let the vector a=(a1,…,an) represent the seasonal out-
come at time t and the vector b=(b1,…,bn)  the outcome at t-1. The simi-
larity between two vectors can be determined by the cosine between them. 
With α as the angle between these vectors, the cosine is given by the Eu-
clidean dot product, which is the dot product of the two vectors, divided 
by both vector lengths: 
??? ? ? ????????? ? ?
? ????????
?? ???????? ? ????????
?.  (1) 
The cosine of each angle is within the range -1 to 1. If the two vectors, 
and therefore the seasons they represent, are identical, the angle α be-
tween them will be zero with a cosine value of 1. The application of the 
cosine measure to seasonal outcomes of sport leagues limits the feasible 
realization of angles. In the range employed here, the cosine is a strictly 
monotone decreasing function of α. Consequently, smaller values of the 
cosine display a higher degree of dissimilarity between vectors. In the fol-
lowing analysis, the similarity between two seasons is compared by their 
point distributions (referred to by the index p) as well as the relative 
changes in ranking positions (referred to by the index r). With the maxi-
mum feasible angle between two vectors, the season-to-season similarity 
indices ?? and ?? are normalized to values between 0 and 1, with 1 indi-
cating that they are identical and 0 meaning the greatest possible change 
between seasons. 
 
Point-distribution similarity 
The distribution of points gained in a league is the foundation of the 
abovementioned static measure of outcome uncertainty within one season. 
By comparing the teams anonymously, these measures are not appropriate 
for capturing outcome uncertainty, due to relative changes in seasonal 
                                        
1  In chemistry, as well as in physics, vector angles are also used to measure similar-
ities and dissimilarities; see, for instance, Klein (1995) and Ruch, Schranner and 
Seligmann (1978). 
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rankings. The point distribution of two consecutive seasons will always be 
an ordering from the most points to the fewest points. Thus, the vectors a, 
b will always point in roughly the same direction. Therefore, the angles 
between the two seasons’ vectors will be small. The greatest difference 
between seasons would be achieved by comparing a maximum unbal-
anced with a totally even league. The latter is given by the identical num-
ber of points for each team. A totally unbalanced league ranking is given 
by one team winning all its games and the second team winning all but 
those against the first team and so on.  
Proposition 1: The similarity between two seasons with respect to their 
point distribution is given by: 
?? ?
? ????????????
??????? , (2) 
with ? ? ?? ? ? yielding the maximum feasible angle:???? ?? ?
? ????????????.  
Proof: The maximum feasible angle between two vectors representing 
seasonal point distributions is defined as the angle between a totally bal-
anced and a totally unbalanced league. Without loss of generality, let ap 
be the vector of a completely unequal outcome of a double round-robin 
tournament with n teams and let bp be the vector of a completely equal 
outcome of the same tournament with w points for a win and t points for a 
tie. Then, ap and bp are given by: 
?? ? ???? ? ???? ??? ? ????? ? ??? ???, 
?? ? ???? ? ???? ? ? ??? ? ?????? (3) 
 
With ? ??????? ? ???????? the maximum angle is given by: 
??? ?? ? ?
????
???????? ?
???????????
?? ??? ????????????? ? ?
?????
???????.  (4) 
// 
For an explanation of Proposition 1, note that the lowest degree of similar-
ity between two seasons, given by (4), is determined solely by the number 
of teams playing in the league and is independent of the number of points 
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rewarded for a win or a tie. The index ?? is therefore applicable to all kind 
of point systems.2 If two seasons have the same point distribution, it fol-
lows that ?? ? ?. If there is a change from a totally balanced to a totally 
unbalanced league, or vice versa, it follows that??? ? ?. Higher index 
values indicate a higher degree of similarity of the point distribution. 
 
Rank similarity 
Changes in relative team standings are more interesting than changes in 
the point distribution. As mentioned, the vectors representing seasons ac-
cording to their point distribution will always point roughly in the same 
direction, as they are orderings from the most to the fewest points. How-
ever, since the vector ar denotes the order of the ranks ar=(1,2,…n-1,n), 
each team is represented by its rank for the respective season t. The next 
season’s vector br is the ordering of the previous season t-1, but with each 
team being assigned the rank of Season t, for instance br=(2,…,n-1,n,1). 
In this example, the last team of Season t-1 was the first team in Season t, 
whereas all other relative positions remained unchanged. This approach is 
easily applicable in a closed-league system. In an open league, with a sys-
tem of promotion and relegation, as in all major European soccer leagues, 
it is necessary to decide how to represent promotion and relegation. In this 
paper, the rank numbers of the relegated teams of Season t-1 are assigned 
to the promoted teams of Season t. With this approach, both vectors will 
have the same length.  
Proposition 2: The similarity between two seasons, with respect to rela-
tive team standings, is given by: 
?? ? ? ????????????????????? , (5) 
with ? ? ?? ? ? and the maximum feasible angle given by: ??? ?? ?
???
?????   
                                        
2  Furthermore, it is also applicable to vectors with different Euclidean lengths. An 
overview of how the cosine reacts to different Euclidean lengths can be found in 
Egghe and Leydesdorff (2009). 
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Proof: Both vectors are permutations of each other with n rank numbers. 
The product of both lengths is the sum of the n first square numbers: 
? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??? ??????? ?? ??????? ? ?? ?? ????? ?????????????? . (6) 
The maximum angle is determined by the largest number of possible 
changes in relative rankings. Because the denominator of (1) is fixed by 
the number of teams n, the maximum angle and therefore, the lowest fea-
sible cosine, is given by the lowest dot product. The highest number of 
changes in relative standings is achieved by a completely reversed order-
ing.  The lowest feasible dot product is attained when the highest value of 
one vector is multiplied by the lowest value of the other vector, the second 
highest by the second lowest, and so on. This is a second degree arithme-
tic progression equal to: ? ??? ? ??? ? ????????  The maximum angle is 
therefore: 
??? ?? ? ?? ?????????
??????
???????????? ?
???
????  (7) 
and the minimum angle is zero. With these values for ??, the index ?? can 
be normalized to values between zero and one. // 
Note that for two seasons which are equal in relative rankings, it follows 
that ?? ? ?. If the largest feasible number of changes occurs, then the in-
dex value is given by ?? ? ?. Higher index values indicate a greater simi-
larity of the relative ranking. 
Proposition 3: The average value of ?? in a totally balanced league is 0.5. 
Values higher (lower) than 0.5 indicate that the relative ranking volatility 
is lower (higher) than in a balanced league. 
Proof: The average value of ?? for all n! possible changes from season to 
season, which occur with the same probability, is given by: 
??
?? ? ?
???
??? ?
?
??
???????
???????????? ? ? ??????? , (8) 
with ? ? ? ???????  being the sum of all possible rank changes. Thus: 
??
?? ? ?
???
??? ?
?
??
???????
?????????????? ? ??????????? ?
??
? ?
?????????
????????????? ?
???
??? ?
???. (9) 
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Proposition 4: The index ?? places no weight on the absolute position in 
a rank change. As long as the changing teams have the same distance be-
tween each other in the ranking, the index will have the same value.  
Proof: Let b1 and b2 be two vectors representing the rankings of seasons 
in which only two teams, both times having the same distance j in the 
ranking, change positions, compared with a season a, then the difference 
between the indexes ??? and ??? will be zero, independent of the absolute 
positions of the teams.  
??? ? ??? ? ????????????????? ?
???
??? ?
??????
??????????? ?
???
???  
? ??? ? ??? ? ???????????? ????? ? ?????  
? ??? ? ??? ?
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????   
? ??? ? ??? ? ???????????? ??? ? ? (10) 
// 
Hence, the index measures relative positional changes only and captures 
the rank volatility and rank similarity of a league. 
 
4 Competitive balance in the German Bundesliga 
4.1 Season-to-season similarity  
With these similarity measures, the dynamic competitive balance of the 
German Bundesliga can be analyzed. Figure 1 shows the development of 
seasonal similarity measures for the German Bundesliga and Table 1 pre-
sents the respective descriptive statistics. It is clear that seasons differ on-
ly marginally in their point distributions. 
Even given that season outcomes in points are an ordering and that their 
vectors, therefore always point roughly in the same direction, the similari-
ty is nearly always above 0.9. The changes from season to season are rela-
tively small and the point distributions of a season are also similar each 
year. By contrast, the changes in relative team standings are much more 
pronounced. As noted above, in a totally balanced league, each ranking 
and therefore each value between one and zero for the index, has the same 
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probability. On average, a competitively balanced league would have a 
rank volatility of 0.5. In the German Bundesliga, the average rank volatili-
ty is 0.765, with a minimum rank volatility of 0.551. The latter represents 
the largest season-to-season change in relative team standings and oc-
curred in the 1969/1970 season. Overall, the team rankings in the German 
Bundesliga are largely determined by their previous relative positions in 
the league. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Season-to-season changes in the German Bundesliga from 1964 
to 2011 (based on data from bundesliga.de, 2011) 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of season-to-season changes in the German 
Bundesliga from 1964 to 2011 
 σp - Point distribution  σr  - Rank volatillity 
Mean 0.968 0.765 
Median 0.975 0.784 
Maximum 0.995 0.905 
Minimum 0.898 0.551 
Std. Dev. 0.020 0.090 
Source: Own estimation based on data from bundesliga.de (2011). 
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4.2 Season-to-season similarity and static competitive balance 
The season-to-season similarity measure introduced in this paper is a use-
ful supplement to the established static measures of competitive balance. 
Figure 2 shows the development of various measures of competitive bal-
ance of the German Bundesliga.  
 
 
Figure 2: Measures of the competitive balance in the German Bundesliga 
1964 to 20113 (based on data from bundesliga.de, 2011) 
 
The standard deviation of winning percentage ratio indicates that seasons 
in the Bundesliga are sometimes more unbalanced, and sometimes more 
balanced, than would be expected in an ideally balanced league. This 
                                        
3  Note the different dimensions of the measures. 
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could be interpreted as if the German Bundesliga was more or less com-
petitively balanced and that there was a high degree of outcome uncertain-
ty. However this impression may be misleading as the rank volatility in-
dex proposed in this paper indicates that the relative standing of teams 
does not vary that much. As mentioned, in a totally balanced league, any 
outcome has the same probability. Thus, all values of rank volatility be-
tween zero and one should have the same probability and, consequently, 
the average value would be 0.5. This is not the case for the German Bun-
desliga, as the average value is 0.765. Hence, the changes in relative rank-
ings are considerably smaller than in a balanced league. Even if the out-
come of individual seasons might be considered balanced, the league as a 
whole seems to be unbalanced. The correlations between the various 
measures for competitive balance considered here for the German Bun-
desliga are shown in Table 2. First of all, the high correlation between the 
standard deviation of winning percentages and the Herfindahl Index is 
noteworthy. Furthermore, the Gini coefficient is highly significantly cor-
related with both measures, so that these three indices seem to evaluate 
the same kind of outcome uncertainty. Even using different approaches to 
measure the inequality in seasonal outcomes, they nevertheless evaluate 
the competitive balance of leagues in a similar manner. 
The standard deviation of the winning percentage ratio, as well as the Her-
findahl Index, is not significantly correlated with the two season-to-season 
similarity indices. Consequently, the competitive balance of one season 
seems to be independent of the outcome uncertainty which originates 
from relative positional changes from season to season. The two above-
mentioned measures of season similarity are not correlated with each oth-
er. The similarity in point distribution of succeeding seasons is independ-
ent of the similarity in relative rank positions. More surprising is the sig-
nificant, but nevertheless relatively low correlation of the Gini coefficient 
and the rank volatility measurement, as both differ largely with respect to 
their approach to measuring competitive balance.   
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Table 2: Correlation of measures of competitive balance for the German 
Bundesliga 1964 to 2011 
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Standard Deviation of win-
ning percentages ratio 
1 0.634*** 0.952*** 0.084 0.240 
Gini (Utt Fort adjusted)  1 0.519*** 0.020 0.339** 
Herfindahl Index   1 0.062 0.159 
Season-to-season changes      
σp - Point distribution    1 0.060 
σr - Rank volatility     1 
*** 1% level of significance, ** 5 % level of significance, * 10% level of 
significance. 
Source: Own estimation based on data from bundesliga.de (2011). 
 
Table 3 shows the average values for the measures used here over several 
decades of the German Bundesliga. In the last ten years of the sample, the 
standard deviations, as well as the Herfindahl Indices, yield values slight-
ly above their averages, indicating a decreasing competitive balance in the 
German Bundesliga. On the other hand, the standard deviation of winning 
percentage ratio was lower in the new millennium than at the beginning of 
the Bundesliga. This indicates an increasing competitive balance.  Over 
the entire period under consideration, the average value for the standard 
deviation ratio, as well as for the Herfindahl Index, oscillates moderately 
around their total average values. This indicates that the point inequality 
does not vary very much over time and it is actually close to the expected 
value in a totally balanced league. The Gini coefficient increases margin-
ally over time, implying a decreasing competitive balance. However, 
Vector Similarity as a New Measure of Dynamic Competitive Balance  101 
 
 
 
these indices measure the outcome of seasons only, ignoring relative team 
standings. Treating teams anonymously biases the analysis of competitive 
balance in a league. The index for season-to-season similarity in team 
ranks increases over time for the German Bundesliga. This is a clear sign 
of a decreasing competitive balance. The position of the teams seems 
more fixed now than they were in the first decade of the German Bun-
desliga.  
 
Table 3: Average values for measures of competitive balance for the 
German Bundesliga 1964 to 2011 
 60’s 70’s 80’s 90’s 00’s Over
all 
Standard Deviation of winning 
percentages ratio 
1.098 0.956 1.060 0.948 1.065 1.021 
Gini (Utt Fort adjusted) 0.310 0.355 0.394 0.362 0.434 0.379 
Herfindahl Index 0.060 0.058 0.059 0.059 0.060 0.059 
Season-to-season changes:        
σp - point distribution 0.992 0.996 0.997 0.996 0.996 0.996 
σr - rank volatility 0.696 0.732 0.823 0.747 0.815 0.765 
Source: Own estimation based on data from bundesliga.de (2011). 
 
5 Conclusion 
A number of different measures can be used to determine the competitive 
balance of a sport league. However, outcome uncertainty has many di-
mensions and the majority of commonly employed measures focus on the 
imbalance within one season. They treat teams anonymously and concen-
trate on the point distributions or the win averages. As an additional di-
mension of competitive balance, the similarity between consecutive sea-
sons is considered in this paper. The inequality of point distribution is an 
important part of the competitive balance, but the seasonal similarity does 
affect the competitive balance over time as well. Existing measures of dy-
namic competitive balance are barely applicable to an open league with a 
102 Vector Similarity as a New Measure of Dynamic Competitive Balance 
 
 
three-point system. In order to measure the similarity between consecutive 
seasons in leagues such as those of European football, a season-to-season 
similarity index is proposed in this paper. This is well suited to measuring 
the similarity between relative team positions in a league’s ranking, as 
well as the similarity between point distributions. Both the team ranking 
and point distribution of one season can be represented by a vector. The 
similarity between consecutive seasons is then given by the angle between 
these vectors. 
The similarity indices introduced in this paper indicate a development in 
the competitive balance of the German Bundesliga, which contradicts the 
well-established indices, e.g. the standard deviation. In the last few years, 
the spread around the average in win percentages reveals no clear devel-
opment in the competitive balance, but at the same time, the volatility of 
rankings decreased, which clearly shows a lower degree of competitive 
balance. At present, the similarity between relative team standings is at an 
all-time high in the German Bundesliga. This implies a high degree of 
predictability of league outcomes.  
As topics for further research, the dynamic competitive balance for all 
major European sport leagues can be recommended, with the aim of com-
paring the results with the static measurements. Furthermore, the applica-
tion of the season-to-season similarity indices to leagues with unbalanced 
league schedules or playoff systems should be considered. Finally, the ef-
fect of the dynamic competitive balance on the demand for league sports 
should also be investigated. 
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6 The Election of a World Champion 
 
 
Martin Langen, Thomas Krauskopf  
 
 
Abstract. This paper examines the mechanisms by which a World Cham-
pion is chosen in the Formula One Championship. Furthermore it is ana-
lyzed whether there is a best method to do this. For this purpose we will 
discuss the methods used by the Fédération Internationale de 
l’Automobile (FIA) since the founding of the World Championship in 
1950. We show how the election of a method affects the Formula One 
contest. We then give insight whether there is a best method to select a 
World Champion or not. We therefore discuss Arrow’s Impossible Theo-
rem with respect to this sports contest. Moreover we simulated several 
seasons and compared different scoring vectors with respect to indicators 
that might be important for viewer’s demand.  
 
 
Keywords: Social Choice, Aggregation rules, Ranking, Sport, Formula 
One  
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1 Introduction  
The Formula One World Championship is a car race series with a long 
tradition. It started in 1950 and became one of the biggest sports events 
worldwide. During the last sixty years there were several rule changes re-
garding the organization of the competition between drivers and teams 
and with respect to the determination of the world champion. In the be-
ginning of 2009 the Fédération Internationale de l´Automobile (FIA), 
which organizes the Championship, intended to change, among other 
things, the rules for choosing the Formula One World Champion.1 This 
was not the first time the FIA modified the rules. Since 1950, there were 
actually four major changes. However the negative reaction to the sug-
gested rule change was quite intense. The intention of the FIA was to 
modify the selection of the world champion via a scoring function and to 
install a rule where only the numbers of victories are decisive. The an-
nouncement of this concept started a public debate after some newspapers 
noted the fact that several of the past world championships would have 
had different outcomes if the new rules would had been employed.2 The 
following protests were successful and the FIA first postponed the intro-
duction of the new rules to 2010 and then skipped the plan altogether. In-
stead the FIA introduced a modification of the traditional scoring vectors.  
However there are several questions that need to be answered: Why had 
the protest been so intense? How much would the rule change have mat-
tered? The central question, though, is: Is there a best way to determine a 
world champion and if there is how does it look like?  
There are several studies that did research on the topic Formula One. Kip-
ker (2002) and Krauskopf, Langen and Bünger (2010) did research in tel-
evision viewer’s demand and Mastromarco and Runkel (2004) examined 
the relationship of rule changes and competitive balance. Furthermore 
Stadelmann and Eichenberger (2008) wanted to find the best driver of all 
                                        
1  Further changes dealt with budget limits and technical limitations.  
2  Of course it is too simple to review a rule change by comparing what this rule 
would have done in the past without anticipating a behavioral change of the ac-
tors. This is common economic knowledge since Robert Lucas (1976). 
The Election of a World Champion 109 
 
 
 
time. But as far as we know there are no studies examining different ways 
of the world champion determination. 
To analyze this question we examine in section 2 different scoring vectors 
and within a simple model we show in how many cases different scoring 
vectors would nevertheless produce the same world champion. To analyze 
whether there is a best way to determine the best driver we examine in 
section 3 the Arrow Theorem and apply it to the Formula One competi-
tion. We show that with some simple assumptions the only possible meth-
od in this sport contest is to select the world champion via a scoring func-
tion. In section 4 we analyze some aspects besides deciding the world 
championship that might have relevance for choosing an appropriate scor-
ing vector. We analyze the rule change of 2010 and give some insight on 
how a best scoring vector could look like. The fifth section concludes. 
 
2 Scoring vectors of the Formula One  
A scoring function assigns for every alternative, depending on the place in 
a single ranking, a specific number of points and is aggregating several 
rankings to one final ranking by ordering via the total points of each alter-
native. This basic scheme can be modified in many ways. In the history of 
the Formula One World Championship six different scoring functions or 
more precisely scoring vectors were used.3 
Table 1 shows all the vectors that were used, labeled with the year they 
were established. With the proposed but now rejected rules everything 
would have stayed the same except for the determination of the first place 
in the final ranking. For this purpose only the first places in each race 
would have been taken into account. This can be interpreted in terms of 
social choice as a simple plurality vote (Gaertner 2006) and the vector 
                                        
3  Until 1991 it was usual that not all results were counted. Until 1959 the driver 
with the fastest lap in a race earned an addition point. As we are interested only in 
the difference the vectors make we are subtracting from these facts. 
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would look like a2010fia.4 It is important to notice that the suggested vec-
tor should only determine the world champion. All the other places in the 
final ranking would have been determined by a2003. One reason for this 
could have been that a simple plurality vote in some cases does not result 
in a complete transitive order. This paradox was first described by Con-
dorcet (1785) and occurred in the Formula One in 2002 (Soares et al., 
2005).  
 
Table 1: Scoring vectors in the Formula One 
Scoring 
vector  
1st  2nd  3rd  4th  5th  6th  7th  8th  9th  10th  
a1950  8  6  4  3  2  0  0  0  0  0  
a1960  8  6  4  3  2  1  0  0  0  0  
a1961  9  6  4  3  2  1  0  0  0  0  
a1991  10  6  4  3  2  1  0  0  0  0  
a2003  10  8  6  5  4  3  2  1  0  0  
a2010  25  18  15  12  10  8  6  4  2  1  
a2010fia  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  
a2010fota  12  9  7  5  4  3  2  1  0  0  
 
It is interesting, especially when changing from one scoring vector to an-
other, in how many cases different scoring vectors deliver different aggre-
gations. It is trivial that different scoring vectors can lead to different 
rankings, except if they are monotone transformations of each other. Saari 
(1984) has shown how many different rankings can be generated out of 
the same profile by using different scoring functions. Some further re-
marks on this topic in the Formula One came from Kladroba (2000). In 
the following we are examining only in how many cases different scoring 
vectors are leading to the same world champions applied to the same sea-
son outcome.  
                                        
4  The Formula One Teams Association (FOTA) suggested the a2010fota vector as 
an alternative for the a2010fia in the discussion of 2009. 
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For a small number of different outcomes this is quite easy and the sim-
pler problems can be solved by using pen and paper. But in the case of the 
Formula One the numbers are far too big. With m drivers and n races in 
the season there are ????? possible different outcomes. By only examin-
ing the p places where points can be earned the number slightly reduces to 
??
????????? . Taking the values of the 2009 season with m=20, n=17 and 
p=8 we get approximately ???? ? ????? different possible outcomes and 
this is far too great to calculate.  
To measure the differences between two scoring vectors we therefore 
tested them with random samples. First we created a random outcome of 
one race and by doing this n times, we got a random season. Then we used 
the two scoring vectors we wanted to compare to determine the world 
champion for that simulated season. We simulated 1000 seasons deter-
mining the fraction of concordant world champions and repeated this 
1000 times. We implicitly assume that every season outcome has the same 
possibility, i.e. all drivers are equally strong. We did this to give insight in 
all theoretical possible outcomes, not to give a realistic model. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of the comparison of a2003 and a2010fia 
Mean  Median  Max  Min  Std. Dev.  
0.529  0.529  0.584  0.476  0.016  
Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera  Observations  
-0.047  3.052 0.483 1000   
 
According to Table 2, which shows the descriptive statistics of the com-
parison between the vectors a2003 and a2010fia, the results are normally 
distributed. This is also confirmed by the significant low value of the 
Jacque-Bera test. The central limit theorem states that the mean of a suffi-
ciently large number of independent random variables each with finite 
mean and variance will be approximately normally distributed. So our 
sample is sufficiently big enough and in Table 3 we are only reporting the 
means of our observations. 
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Table 3: Comparison of the vectors used in the Formula 1 
 a1960 a1961 a1991 a2003 a2010 a2010fia 
a1950 0.926* 0.894 0.894 0.766 0.741 0.542 
a1960 1 0.928* 0.872 0.809 0.755 0.555 
a1961  1 0.941 0.772 0.759 0.616 
a1991   1 0.7301* 0.731 0.661 
a2003    1 0.908* 0.529 
a2010     1 0.367 
a2010fia      1 
 
Comparing all the vectors ever used in the Formula One there are several 
interesting properties. First of all, the values marked with an asterisk in 
Table 3 are the ones where a switch in the Formula One rules actually oc-
curred. It is obvious that the rules suggested for 2010 would mark the big-
gest change in the history of the Formula One. Only in 52.9% the vector 
a2003 and a2010fia deliver the same world champion. The second biggest 
change in the history was in 2003 with 73% accordance to the previous 
year’s vector. The vector actually introduced in the beginning of 2010 has 
accordance with the previous vector of 90.8%. The changes before 2003 
were not only small in the degree of the vector change but also in the ef-
fects these changes have onto the world champion decision. 
 
Figure 1: Comparison of a2003 and 2010 with depending on the number 
of drivers and races 
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This is not as radical as making only victories count but raises the ques-
tion of how many additional points for the first place in the a2003 are 
necessary to obtain the same result as the a2010fia. We compared the 
a2010fia and a2003 and gave additional points for the first place in the 
a2003.  
 
 
Figure 2: Accordance of a2010fia and modified versions of a2003 
 
In Figure 2 we can of course see an increase which converts to 1, which 
means total conformity. It reaches total conformity with 30 additional 
points for the first place, hence 40 points in total. However also with 10 
points, only twice as much as in a2003 amount, we get conformity of 
around 85%. The discussion of 2009 seems less dramatic from this per-
spective. As the numbers of drivers or races per season differ from time to 
time we tested the differences of the a2003 and a2010fia for alternative 
numbers of drivers and races. We can see in Figure 1 that for two drivers 
the vectors do not differ at all, which is not surprising considering that ties 
are decided with the respective other vector. After this the compliance 
steadily declines to a value of around 0.5 and with more than 11 drivers 
does not seem to alter anymore. 
The picture is slightly different for alternative numbers of races. For one 
race the value is of course 1, has a second peak at 4 and after this is con-
stantly going down. Taking a Formula One season with more than four 
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races for granted we can say that more races mean more different results 
with these two vectors. Looking at the discussion of introducing a new 
point system at the beginning of the 2009 season it was common sense to 
strengthen the importance of the first place. The FOTA suggested a vector 
with a raise of 2 points for the first place.  
 
3 Some Background from Social Choice Theory  
After showing the differences the vectors of the Formula One have made 
in the election of a world champion we now try to identify a best method. 
Since there are several parallels between the determination of a winner in 
a Formula One season and the aggregation of preferences, social choice 
theory may provide some insights.5 Aggregating the outcomes of all races 
into the determination of a world champion is similar to the aggregation 
of different preferences into the choice of a collective action.   
Arrow (1951) mentioned four preferable conditions an aggregation func-
tion should comply with and he furthermore showed that no aggregation 
rule could simultaneously meet all four requirements. The four conditions 
are the unrestricted domain condition, the weak Pareto principle, the inde-
pendence of irrelevant alternatives and non-dictatorship. The unrestricted 
domain condition requests that no individual preference ordering should 
be excluded a priori. If all individuals prefer one alternative with respect 
to another, the weak Pareto principle implies that this preference should 
also hold for the aggregated preference. The independence of irrelevant 
alternatives declares that the comparison of two alternatives should only 
depend on these two alternatives. The non-dictatorship condition demands 
that no individual should be able to determine the result of the preference 
ordering no matter how the other individual’s preferences look like.  
These conditions are to be applied to a Formula One season. To have a 
“fair” championship there should not be the possibility of excluding any 
theoretical possible outcome of the championship a priori. This is certain-
                                        
5  For this we are subtracting from the fact that there might be changes throughout 
the season like strategy, driver´s form etc.. 
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ly true for the championship. If the non-dictatorship condition was violat-
ed there would be one, and only one, race that determines the season’s 
ranking making all other races irrelevant. This cannot be in the interest of 
the FIA so this condition should not be violated. In fact an even stronger 
version of non-dictatorship holds, called anonymity (Gaertner 2006). An-
onymity means, that all races in the season are equally important for the 
final ranking. It is easy to see that also the weak Pareto principle should 
be satisfied. As there are only strict preferences in each race with the 
weak Pareto principle, a driver who is always better than another driver 
should also be better in the final ranking.6 In combination with the other 
conditions the weak Pareto principle leads to neutrality. This means that 
by changing the positions of any two drivers in every race the same 
change will occur in the championship ranking. At first sight it should be 
clear that if these conditions are not met an aggregation rule would ne-
glect fundamental intuitions about fairness in a sports contest. As shown 
by Arrow no rule can satisfy all conditions mentioned above. Therefore, 
all feasible aggregation rules employed by the Formula One will violate 
the independence of irrelevant alternatives. The comparison of two drivers 
in the final ranking will depend on the performance of the other drivers.   
Apart from the conditions mentioned by Arrow, an aggregation rule in 
sport competition should also satisfy the condition of consistency. That 
means that drivers who are in the best set of every subset of the season, 
should also be in the best set of the whole season. Considering these fun-
damental rules, Young (1975) stated the characteristics of the aggregation 
rule: “A social choice function is anonymous, neutral and consistent if and 
only if it is a scoring function”. If it is not possible to satisfy all preferable 
conditions, a more or less pronounced balance between these conditions 
should be found. By declaring some conditions to be more important than 
others, the only stable solution to aggregate the results of the races is a 
                                        
6  This might not apply for those ranks in the races where zero points are earned. 
This can be disregarded when only the top positions in the championship are con-
sidered. 
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scoring function. And as we have seen, since the founding of the Formula 
One championship, this has been exactly the way the FIA aggregated the 
results. 
 
4 Is there a best scoring vector?  
The Arrow Theorem shows that the only adequate method is to aggregate 
the results via a scoring function. This leaves the question for the appro-
priate scoring vector. There are endless different possibilities how a scor-
ing vector can be constructed. Some remarks for scoring vectors in sports 
contests came from Petigk (1990). In the Formula One six different scor-
ing vectors were used. To answer the question whether there is a best 
scoring vector we first need an aim the scoring vector should be best in. 
The first but not the only goal is of course the selection of the season’s 
best driver. But even the definition of the best driver depends highly on 
normative considerations. Is a constant driver better than a driver with a 
higher variance in places but more top results? Furthermore the selection 
of the best driver might be the most important but not the only objective 
the scoring vector should accomplish. The FIA, as the organizer of the 
world championship, could have a lot of alternative aims. We assume that 
the FIA is an organization with the goal of profit maximization. In the end 
the revenues the FIA can generate are highly depending on spectators’ in-
terest. Spectators´ interest is generating direct revenues and indirect via 
commercial revenues. So we think the objective goal of the FIA is the 
maximization of spectators’ interest. A lot of the variables which are used 
to describe spectators’ interest are based on the concepts of fairness and 
suspense or uncertainty of outcome (e.g. Simmons, 2009).  
In the following we again simulate Formula One seasons and adopt differ-
ent vectors to generate rankings. We then compare the results of these ag-
gregations and show how the scoring vectors affect variables that are im-
portant for the viewer’s demand. In contrast to the simulation in section 2 
we now used different winning probabilities for the drivers. We assign for 
the drivers, who can also be interpreted as combinations of drivers and 
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cars, units of talent. The talent units of one driver divided by the sum of 
all drivers’ talent units is his winning probability. The complete assign-
ment of talent units is a talent distribution. We used six different talent 
distributions to compare the vectors and the particular talent units per 
driver can be seen, along with the Gini coefficient of these distributions, 
in Table 4.  
 
Table 4: Talent distributions 
Driver 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
Distribution            
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  
2 4 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  
3 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11  
4 10 6 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  
5 10 9 9 8 8 7 14 13 12 11  
6 1024 512 256 128 64 32 16 8 4 2  
Driver 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20  
Distribution           Gini 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.204 
3 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0.317 
4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.397 
5 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0.499 
6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.844 
 
In the first distribution every driver has one unit of talent which means 
that the possibility of every place is the same for every driver. In the sec-
ond distribution driver 1 has four units of talent, driver 2 three units and 
so on. In the third distribution talent is constantly decreasing. The forth 
distribution is a more extreme version of the second distribution. In the 
fifth distribution we modeled three teams that are stronger than the rest 
and with a slight inequality in drivers’ talent. In the sixth distribution, be-
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ginning with the tenth best driver, the drivers have the double amount of 
talent units compared to the next best driver.   
A race simulation, for example with the second distribution, is calculated 
in the following way. We begin with the total talent population.7 From 
this population a driver is chosen randomly, represented by one number. 
This is the winner of the first race. After this we removed all the other tal-
ent units of this driver in case there are any left. Then we are repeating 
this for all places until we have a whole race outcome. By repeating this n 
times we get a season existing of n races. For every value we present in 
the following, 1000 seasons were simulated  
Next we have to choose variables that are proxies for viewer’s attention. 
We assume that the longer a world championship is undecided the more 
suspense it has. Another cause for suspense might be the total amount of 
different champions over a number of seasons. For some viewers it could 
be important that the best driver becomes champion. The competitive bal-
ance or uncertainty of outcome is frequently used in the sport economics 
to describe viewer’s attention (e.g. Quirk and Ford (1992)). Usually com-
petitive balance is measured with the Gini coefficient. We compared dif-
ferent scoring vectors according to how they transform the unequal dis-
tributed talent into a point distribution at the end of the season. Our last 
variable is the number of cases, where the vector is not able to decide the 
world championship because of ties. 
In Figure 3 we can see the average number of races after which the season 
is decided. For the most talent distributions (except the 6th distribution) 
the vectors which were actually used in the Formula One do not differ to a 
great extent. The a2010fia compared to the actually used vector delivers 
for some distributions longer and for some other shorter seasons. It is no-
ticeable that the Borda8 vector is generating the highest number of unde-
cided races for all distributions. 
                                        
7 The vector in this case would be: (1,1,1,1,2,2,2,3,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15, 
16,17,18,19,20). 
8  The vector is named after the French mathematician Jean-Charles de Borda. The 
vector assigns one point for the last place and for every better place always one 
point more.   
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Figure 4 shows the number of different world champions the scoring vec-
tors generate. For most of the cases the choice of a scoring vector does not 
matter as the number of different world champions does not change. Ex-
ceptions are the talent distributions 2 and 3 and the vector a2010fia. With 
both distributions the a2010 delivers more different world champions than 
the a2003 but less than the a2010fia. 
 
 
Figure 3: Average number of races after which a season is decided 
 
As mentioned above the definition of the best driver highly depends on 
normative considerations. In our simulations we therefore tested the pos-
sibility of the most talented driver becoming world champion. As we can 
see in Figure 5 nearly all scoring vectors deliver similar results. So in 
most cases the vectors are not determining the probability for the best 
driver becoming world champion. The one exception is the vector 
a2010fia. For all cases where there actually is a most talented driver the 
appliance of the vector a2010fia leads to a lower probability for the best 
driver becoming world champion.   
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Figure 4: Different Champions in 1000 seasons 
 
In figure 6 the Gini coefficients of the different talent distributions were 
plotted against the Gini coefficients of the point distribution in the final 
ranking. The graphs show how the vectors transform the inequality of tal-
ent into an unequal point distribution. On the 45° line the inequality of 
these two distributions is the same. We see that the highest inequality of 
scored points for every talent distribution, even with equally distributed 
talent, was produced by the a2010fia. The Borda scoring vectors has for 
every talent distribution the lowest corresponding Gini coefficient in point 
distribution. The second lowest coefficient for all talent coefficients has 
got vector a2010 and the third lowest a2003. 
Every vector produces an unequal point distribution and the level of ine-
quality depends, among other things, on the number of ranks the scoring 
vector is assigning point to. For this reason vector a2010fia, with only one 
point rank, always produces the highest inequality. The vectors which 
were used between 1960 and 2003 do not differ in the number of point 
ranks and produce nearly the same relation between the two Ginis. With 
the a2003, a2010 and the Borda vector the equality in the point distribu-
tion is rising with the number of point ranks.  
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Figure 5: How often is the best driver becoming world champion 
 
 
 
Figure 6: The effect of scoring vectors on competitive balance 
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Table 5 provides the fraction of 1000 simulated seasons a vector was not 
able to determine a world champion because ties occurred. The a2010fia 
has always got the highest fraction whereas the Borda has got the lowest 
in most of the cases. Comparing the a2003 and a2010 the latter is better in 
deciding world championships. 
 
Table 5: In how many cases is the vector unable to decide the world 
championship? 
 a1950 a1960 a1961 a1991 a2003 a2010 a2010fia a2010fota Borda 
1 0.082 0.071 0.085 0.074 0.061 0.028 0.485 0.056 0.034 
2 0.029 0.017 0.028 0.015 0.021 0.007 0.306 0.017 0.012 
3 0.055 0.054 0.043 0.037 0.038 0.021 0.363 0.032 0.023 
4 0.014 0.016 0.022 0.016 0.008 0.006 0.161 0.009 0.012 
5 0.032 0.046 0.047 0.036 0.044 0.019 0.304 0.029 0.049 
6 0.007 0.010 0.013 0.003 0.010 0.005 0.062 0.007 0.012 
 
5 Conclusions  
In this paper we have shown that the introduction of a majority vote in the 
election of a Formula One world championship would indeed have been 
the biggest change in the history of different scoring systems in the For-
mula One. We have shown with the Arrow Theorem that the only possible 
method to select a world champion in the Formula One is by aggregating 
the races via a scoring function. The questions whether there is a best 
scoring vector or not cannot be answered in general because it highly de-
pends on normative considerations. We assumed that the FIA is a profit 
maximizer and therefore wants to maximize the viewer’s demand. Thus 
we compared different scoring vectors for different talent distributions 
according to variables that are considered to be important for viewer’s 
demand.   
The vector the FIA introduced in 2010 does not affect the average real 
season; the one suggested at first would have had a bigger impact for this 
variable. The new vector also does not change the probability of the most 
talented driver becoming world champion. But for most distributions the 
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vector actually used in 2010 raises the number of different world champi-
ons. It also produces for all talent distributions a lower inequality in the 
point distribution. Altogether the introduction of the new vector seems to 
be a slight improvement in the variables we choose to analyze.  
In general we can say that vectors with a higher number of point ranks 
generate longer undecided seasons. This leaves less interesting races at the 
end of the season. These vectors also generate lower inequality in the 
point distributions and thus a higher competitive balance. On the other 
hand fewer point ranks make the success of an underdog more realistic. 
Thus such vectors generate a higher number of different champions. To 
establish a best scoring vector more research on the specifics of viewer’s 
demand is needed. Future studies should also examine the suspense in the 
races or in other words the fight for better positions in a race and this ef-
fect on viewer’s demand. Our study shows that the decision for a longer 
or shorter point vector has positive as well as negative effects on viewer’s 
demand. Therefore empirical studies of the importance of different factors 
for the viewer’s demand may provide the solution for a best scoring vec-
tor.   
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Abstract: In this paper an analysis of the determinants of attractiveness of 
the Formula One is attempted. Therefore the concept of competitive bal-
ance will be explained and applied. The principal item of this analysis will 
be the result that there is an optimal level of competitive balance which 
maximizes the attractiveness. This concept will be applied through an em-
pirical analysis of the determinants of the German Formula One number 
of TV viewers. It is shown that the influence of competitive balance is not 
totally clear. A too high level of competitive balance seems to be as det-
rimental as a too low level of competitive balance.  
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1 Introduction  
One of the main determinants of interest of the general public in sports is 
competitive balance. In addition to more formal criteria like the proverbial 
level playing field, the uncertainty of outcome is likely to be a major de-
terminant of whether a discipline attracts millions of viewers or is just one 
of several side issue in Monday’s local newspaper. The dominance of a 
single protagonist, from this point of view, is likely to exert an adverse 
effect on the number of TV viewers. At the same time, however, TV 
viewers like heroes and superstars which stand out from a crowd of com-
petitors, and they like underdogs who unexpectedly win.  
The main issue of this paper is how these two seemingly contradictory ef-
fects influence the attractiveness of motor racing, namely Formula One 
racing.  
Formula One is a sport which is especially popular in Europe and South 
America. It is not researched in such a way as other big “American 
Sports” like Basketball, Baseball or American Football (Vrooman, 1995), 
although it is the biggest and most valuable annual worldwide sport event 
(Deloitte, 2008).1 An interesting economic aspect of Formula One is the 
way the competition is being organized: In Formula One, we can observe, 
different from Basketball, Baseball or American Football, a direct simul-
taneous competition among competitors. Another interesting economic 
aspect of Formula One is that it aspects of both individual and team 
sports. On the one hand, it is the individual driver who attracts the atten-
tion of the audience’s. On the other hand, identification with a team seems 
to play an important role for the audience. Therefore, Formula One com-
bines elements of team sports and individual sports. Consequently, we are 
interested in analyzing the determinants of drivers’ performance. 
                                        
1  Of course, there are some worldwide sport events which have more spectators like 
the Fifa Football World Cup, the Fifa Football Euro Championship or the Olym-
pic Games, but these events are not organized annually. The NFL Superbowl also 
causes a high and often higher worldwide TV interest than a single Formula One 
race, but it only takes place once a year.   
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Our research builds on earlier research of the Formula One by Spenke and 
Beilken (2000) and Mastrmarco and Runkel (2004).Spenke and Beilken 
use the database of Formula One races to analyze data analysis tool. 
Mastromarco and Runkel analyze the effects of rule changes in Formula 
One and their impact on competitive balance. We also draw on research 
by Kipker (2003), who describes the determinants of competitive balance 
which are supposed to influence the suspense of competition. He de-
scribes three levels of competitive balance, uncertainty of race outcome, 
uncertainty of championship outcome and the absence of long-term domi-
nance. The viewers interest is measured by the number of TV viewers. 
Kipker also describes the role played by superstars in Formula One.2 Fi-
nally, our research builds on earlier research on the theory of sport leagues 
(Vrooman, 1995) and on research on the determinant of demand for sports 
(Borland and Macdonald, 2003). While the previous papers focus on 
competitive balance as a factor supposed to be instrumental for the attrac-
tiveness of competition, we argue that competitive balance is not the only 
factor influencing attractiveness. To this end, we shall describe a theory 
that renders it possible to trace out the optimal level of competitive bal-
ance. Our main assumption is that both a very low and a very high level of 
competitive balance are detrimental for the attractiveness of Formula One. 
The economic intuition motivating this assumption is that a sport is attrac-
tive for TV viewers if a championship is very close and competition is 
balanced. We, thus, show that this balanced competition is not the only 
competition-related determinant of attractiveness of Formula One. Espe-
cially duels at the top of the overall standing also play an important role. 
We structure the remainder of our paper as follows. In Chapter 2, we give 
a short overview of the theoretical assumptions underlying our theory, and 
we explain which factors determine the attractiveness of Formula One. 
We also explain how we quantify the attractiveness of Formula One. In 
Chapter 3, we present the data we used for our analyses. In Chapter 4, we 
                                        
2  For a general exhibition of superstar effects, see Rosen (1981).  
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describe the empirical method and report our results. In Chapter 5, we 
conclude. 
 
2 The theory of attractiveness of Formula One  
The theoretical approach we will investigate is quite simple. The main 
point of our description is that there has to be an optimal level of competi-
tive balance which maximizes the viewer’s interest. We assume that For-
mula One is not attractive if all drivers have the same chances to win. In 
this case there would be no surprise if an unknown driver won a race or 
the championship. Thus a main condition for attractiveness is that there 
are real surprises like the victory of an outsider or the failure of a champi-
on. On the other hand it is assumed that it is not really attractive if there is 
a driver who dominates the whole competition because this could lead to a 
situation where the championship is determined too early in the season. It 
is not our aim to show the exact optimum of competitive balance which 
maximizes the attractiveness. All we want to show is that this optimum 
could exist by analyzing the following two working hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1: A higher level of competitive balance leads to less attrac-
tiveness.  
Hypothesis 2: A duel at the top leads to more attractiveness. 
 
These preliminary hypotheses will be specified later. If the analysis of 
both hypotheses results in a non-rejection we can assume that our consid-
erations are correct.  
But before we can answer the question what influences the level of attrac-
tiveness of a sport it has to be clarified how to measure the attractiveness 
of a sport. Here it is suggested to operationalize attractiveness by viewer 
interest namely the number of TV viewers (Kipker, 2003). This measure 
has certain advantages: it is quantitative and in principle easy to measure. 
Of course, there are other possible indicators for attractiveness like per-
sonal preferences or tickets sold for seats at the circuit. In particular per-
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sonal preferences could indicate the attractiveness much more accurate 
than the number of TV viewers. However, the problem is that it is hardly 
possible to directly collect data on preferences. An advantage of the num-
ber of tickets sold would be that they can be surveyed even more easily 
than the number of TV viewers. But as the number of seats at the circuits 
is limited this data is truncated.3 This is the essential advantage of the 
number of TV viewers as a measurement because the number of viewers 
is quasi unlimited. In Germany, e. g., there are ca. 35 million television 
sets for 80 million citizens (GEZ, n. d.). In addition, no Formula One 
event ever came near a full use of the capacity, i.e., a viewer level around 
90 percent. Thus, virtually everyone who wants to watch a Formula One 
race can watch it.  
To answer the question how to find parameters that influence the attrac-
tiveness we suggest the concept of competitive balance (Utt and Fort, 
2002). The level of competitive balance is high if there are similar chanc-
es to win for all participants. Referred to Formula One this means that all 
drivers have the same chance to win a race and the championship. The 
opposite is true for a low level of competitive balance. However, if you 
take into account that there are different Formula One cars with different 
engines which are driven by persons of different talents the assumption of 
same or just similar chances to win has to be doubted. To quantify com-
petitive balance the Gini coefficient which is a concentration index is a 
very useful tool. It is mostly used in the analysis of team sports like base-
ball, basketball or American Football (Utt and Fort, 2002). The applica-
tion for individual sports like Formula One, however, is rare. However, in 
this case the application of the Gini coefficient seems to be meaningful as 
the drivers score different points for ending a race in different places.  
 
                                        
3  Thus, you cannot really estimate the common interest because you do not know 
how many tickets could be sold. One possibility to cope with this problem could 
be to include the shadow market prices for tickets. This procedure, though, would 
negate the advantages of easy access to data. 
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Figure 1: Graphical illustration of the Gini coefficient 
 
In Figure 1 the concept of the Gini coefficient is illustrated in a graphic 
way. The denomination of the axes is the percentage of drivers and the 
percentage of points, which are gained by the drivers. The so-called Line 
of Equality and the Lorenz Curve are also depicted. The Line of Equality 
shows the hypothetical situation when all drivers gain the same amount of 
points. The Lorenz Curve shows the actual concentration of the points 
scored. Because the points, which are gained by the drivers in every race, 
are accumulated through the season there would be a situation of perfect 
equality or balance if 10 percent of all drivers accumulated 10 percent of 
all points and e.g. 50 percent of all drivers have 50 percent of all points. 
But in a situation where 50 percent of all drivers only have 10 percent of 
all points there is a smaller level of balance. This disparity can now be 
quantified by the Gini coefficient. The Gini coefficient is constructed by 
the ratio of area A to the sum of area A and B. A high Gini coefficient 
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implies a high disparity which in turn represents a small competitive bal-
ance.4 If a high level of competitive balance attracts more spectators than 
a smaller level, small values of the Gini coefficient are an indicator for 
attractiveness. An overview about the exact approach and the used scoring 
vector will be given in the following chapter.  
A second index which can be used as a parameter influencing the attrac-
tiveness of Formula One is the relative distance between the first and the 
second driver in the overall standings. This distance signifies the competi-
tive balance at the top of the ranking. If the difference between the first 
and the second driver becomes too large there is the problem that the sport 
could become boring. We assume that a very high relative distance be-
tween the first and the second driver in the overall standings reduces the 
spectator’s interest because the exciting aspect of a duel of these two driv-
ers disappears. Relative distance between first and second driver and not 
absolute distance between them is used as the amount of points and also 
the magnitude of the differences btween drivers increases during the sea-
son. Thus, the absolute distance after the third race and the last race, e. g. 
cannot be compared meaningfully. 
 
3 The data employed in the analysis  
In this chapter an overview about the data used in the analysis will be giv-
en. First, we will have a look at the number of TV viewers. As it can be 
seen in Figure 2 the viewer levels of the German TV network RTL for the 
seasons 1992 until the season 2009 are employed. Germany is one of the 
countries with the highest number of Formula One supporters and the ex-
clusive use of German data is due to data availability. 
The abscissa is scaled by the number of races starting with the first race in 
1992. It is not useful to scale the abscissa in years because the seasons are 
not evenly distributed over the years. In addition, time between two races 
                                        
4  The range of the Gini coefficient is between 0 and 1 where 0 means total equality 
while 1 denotes total concentration. 
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is not equidistant. But mostly the season starts in March and ends in Oc-
tober with two-week intervals between races. The number of races has 
varied in the different seasons and has increased over the years. 
 
 
Figure 2: Formula One number of viewers of German RTL (March 1992 – 
November 2009, Media Control, 2010) 
 
The ordinate is scaled with the number of RTL-TV viewers in million 
persons. Two important points in time are marked by the vertical lines. 
The first line marks the rule change at the beginning of the season in 2003 
when the score vector was changed while the second line stands for the 
point in time when Michael Schumacher temporarily finished his Formula 
One career at the end of the 2006 season (October 2006). These two 
points in time are highlighted because they will be analyzed in the empiri-
cal chapter later on. The rule change, which will be explained more pre-
cisely in the next chapter, consisted of an enlargement of the point ranks. 
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The number of ranks where points could be gained was increased from 6 
to 8 and the amount of scored points was also enlarged.5 
As it can be seen in Figure 2 there are huge differences in the viewing 
levels between two consecutive races. One of the reasons for this is that 
there are races in American time zones, European time zones and Asian-
Pacific time zones (compare Kipker, 2003). Thus, some races take place 
at times which are not convenient to European TV viewers because some 
Asian races start in the early morning. This fact will be taken into account 
in the empirical part of this survey. Another point to mention is that the 
first race of every season is not included in the analysis. The reason for 
this approach will be explained later on.  
 
 
Figure 3: Values of the Gini-coefficent 
 
                                        
5  Thus, the scoring vector representing these rules changed from s1 = (10; 6; 4; 3; 2; 
1) to s2 = (10; 8; 6; 5; 4; 3; 2; 1). 
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Figure 3 shows the Gini coefficient of the cumulated points achieved. 
This corresponds to the Gini coefficient calculated on the basis of the 
overall standings. An important point to mention is that the actual used 
scoring vector s2 was not employed here because in the original scoring 
vectors only the first six places and since 2003 only the first eight places 
are considered. The different number of results endowed with champion-
ship points before and after 2003 further impedes the comparison of these 
different scoring vectors. This leads to the approach to replace the vectors 
s1 and s2 by a modified vector s3 = (22; 21; … ; 2; 1) what means that the 
driver who wins a race gets 22 points, the second driver 21 and so on.6 
Thereby every ranking is considered and the level of competitive balance 
can be analyzed for all drivers. Another important fact is that the scoring 
vector is independent of rule changes, e. g. the modification in 2003. As in  
Figure 2 the points in time when the rule changed and Michael Schu-
macher temporarily ended his career are marked. 
 
 
Figure 4: Relative distance between first and second driver 
 
                                        
6  22 points were chosen as the maximum score as in most of the races included in 
the analysis this corresponds to the number of drivers in the races.  
Optimal Competitive Balance in Formula One 137 
 
 
 
Figure 4 shows the time series of relative distance of the first and the sec-
ond driver in the overall standings. For this analysis the original vectors 
are used. The reason is that this index shall give information about the 
tenseness of the duel. If the modified scoring vector was used instead, this 
tension, which is generated by the real distance in the overall standings, 
would not be considered. Only if the original distances in the overall 
standings are considered, this information can be used. As the distance 
between the points of the first and the second driver has to be identical 
after the first race of each season these races are not included in the analy-
sis (this procedure was also followed in Figure 2 and 3). 
 
4 Empirical Analysis  
With regards to the competitive balance one could assume that a high lev-
el of competitive balance increases the number of TV viewers because 
they want to watch a competition which is not dominated by only one or a 
few group of drivers. It could guarantee a kind of tension if every driver 
has similar chances to win the competition. But this would imply that no 
favorites or outsiders exist whose wins could be a big surprise. Superstars 
or losers would not exist anymore. This leads to the assumption that a too 
high level of competitive balance reduces the interest in this sport. That is 
the reason for the following hypotheses which are specifications of the 
working hypotheses of chapter 2.  
Hypothesis 1: A higher level of competitive balance leads to a weaker 
viewer interest.  
Referring to the relative distance between the first and the second driver 
we assume that a large distance decreases the suspense and therefore the 
attractiveness of the competition. From these thoughts the following hy-
pothesis is derived:  
Hypothesis 2: A small distance between the first and the second driver in-
creases the interest of the TV viewers.  
To analyze the hypothesis a model has to be constructed and estimated. 
An ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is complex enough to analyze 
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the problem. As regressands two time series are used. In estimation a (Ta-
ble 1) the number of TV viewers of the German TV network RTL (com-
pare Kipker, 2003) are used as regressand. In estimation b (Table 2 and 
Table 3) the market ratio, which gives information about the viewing rate, 
is used. The regressors are identical in both models: a constant term (C), a 
trend variable (trend), a quadratic trend variable (trend^2), the Gini coef-
ficient (Gini), the relative distance (relative distance), a so-called prime 
time dummy (Pt dummy), a night dummy, a Schumacher dummy and a 
rule change dummy. The rationale behind the use of the Gini coefficient 
and the relative distance were already explained above. The use of a con-
stant term seems to be necessary because it can be assumed that there is 
always a basic level of viewers. The trend and the quadratic trend are used 
because the first inspection of the data makes a trend development appear 
probable. But this approach can also be explained with regards to content. 
As it can be seen few lines below the Schumacher hype is covered by the 
Schumacher dummy. Next to Schumacher there was also an increasing 
presence of German Formula One drivers in these years. Between 1992 
and 1997 the number of German Formula One drivers increased from 1 to 
3. In 1994 Heinz-Harald Frentzen and in 1997 Ralf Schumacher, Michael 
Schumacher’s brother, joined the Formula One (Formula One Administra-
tion Ltd 2009). 
The prime time dummy is used for those races which are shown in Ger-
man TV at the prime time between 06:00 p.m. and 12:00 p.m. in the even-
ing. These are races taking place in North or South America. The value of 
this dummy is 1 if the race takes place in America and otherwise 0. The 
night dummy is very similar to the prime time dummy. It is 1 if the race 
takes place in East or Southeast Asia or in Pacific regions. It is called the 
night dummy because it applies to races which live TV coverage takes 
place in the early morning hours in Germany between 04:00 a.m. and 
08:00 a.m. The Schumacher dummy is used because there was a Schu-
macher-hype in Germany during Michael Schumacher’s career until 2006. 
Through the use of this dummy we hope to isolate these special Schu-
macher-effects (Kipker, 2003). The rule change dummy is used because 
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we want to analyze the effects of the rule changes at the beginning of the 
year 2003.7  
 
Table 1: Estimation a8 
dependent variable  number of TV viewers  
independent variables  Coefficient  
C  -1.478480***  
trend  0.106740***  
trend^2  -0.000289***  
Gini  7.118657***  
relative distance  -0.840806**  
Pt dummy  1.351560***  
night dummy  -3.462045***  
Schumacher dummy  0.938303**  
rule change dummy  -2.396442***  
F-statistic  182.0259***  
Adjusted R-squared  0.835565  
*** 1% level of significance, ** 5% level of significance, * 10% level of 
significance. 
 
The F-statistic is very high and significant (s. Table 1). Although the R-
squared is very high (0.83) this result should not be overrated because 
some dummy variables are used which automatically increase the R-
squared. All coefficients are significant on a 5 percent level and with ex-
ception of the Schumacher dummy and the coefficient of the relative dis-
tance even significant on a 1 percent level. The constant variable C has a 
negative coefficient, which seems to be unusual when interpreting the 
term as a constant basis level of TV viewers. But this result should also 
                                        
7  Langen, Krauskopf and Bünger (2010) have shown that the modification of rules 
in Formula One can play an important role for the outcome of the championship. 
8  Heteroscedasticity consistent estimators are used. 
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not be overinterpreted because the values of the other coefficients are rela-
tively high. Therefore a positive total of viewers can easily be reached. 
The coefficient of the trend variable is positive while the coefficient of the 
quadratic trend variable is negative. That shows that a quadratic trend of 
viewer interest exists with an increase in the beginning and a decrease in 
later periods. Most dummy variables can be interpreted with ease. The 
prime time dummy has a positive coefficient and the night dummy a nega-
tive coefficient. That shows that the viewer interest increases respectively 
decreases if the race is shown at German prime time respectively at night. 
Also the positive coefficient of the Schumacher dummy is not remarkable. 
An interesting result is the negative coefficient of the rule change dummy, 
especially if one presumes that the rule modification in 2003 was intended 
to increase the attractiveness of Formula One. 
The Gini coefficient has a high positive value. This means that a high Gini 
coefficient leads to higher viewers interest. As a high Gini coefficient 
means a low competitive balance this result can be interpreted in the fol-
lowing way: The viewers do not want to have a high level of competitive 
balance. Instead they want to have a competition which is not balanced. 
Hypothesis 1 cannot be rejected for this reason. The coefficient of the rel-
ative distance is negative. This means that a high relative difference be-
tween the first and the second driver leads to low viewer interest. For this 
reason hypothesis 2 cannot be rejected either. These two results seem to 
contradict each other. But this contradiction can be explained. On the one 
hand the spectators do not want to have a competition which is too bal-
anced and on the other hand they do not want to have a competition with-
out an interesting duel at the top. This shows that an absolute competitive 
balance is as detrimental as a too low level of competitive balance in the 
top region of the competition.   
After analyzing the number of TV viewers the viewing rate, which is the 
relative number of TV viewers, is taken into consideration (Table 2). This 
analysis of the viewing rate leads to similar results as the analysis of the 
number of TV viewers with one important difference: The Schumacher 
dummy loses its statistical significance.   
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Table 2: Estimation b19 Table 3: Estimation b210 
dependent vari-
able  
viewing rate  dependent vari-
able 
viewing rate  
independent 
variables  
Coefficient   independent 
variables  
Coefficient  
C  21.73453***   C  22.89844***  
trend  0.414048***   trend  0.424239***  
trend^2  -0.001229***   trend^2  -0.001291***  
Gini  20.37742***   Gini  19.37797**  
relative distance  -6.083538***   relative distance  -5.485605***  
Pt dummy  -15.99070***   Pt dummy  -15.91289***  
night dummy  11.78425***   night dummy  11.87955***  
Schumacher 
dummy  
1.471344     
rule change 
dummy  
-11.07776***   rule change 
dummy  
-10.31951***  
F-statistic  125.4253***  F-statistic  143.3755***  
Adjusted R-
squared  
0.777414   Adjusted R-
squared  
0.777627  
*** 1% level of significance, ** 5% level of significance, * 10% level of 
significance. 
 
After eliminating this variable the F-statistic increases which shows that 
the Schumacher dummy seems to be dispensable for this specification 
(Table 3). Without the Schumacher dummy it can be seen that the two 
most important variables can be interpreted in the same way as in estima-
tion a (Table 1). One interesting difference is the inversion of the signs for 
the prime time dummy and the night dummy. The coefficient of the prime 
                                        
9  Heteroscedasticity consistent estimators are used. 
10  Heteroscedasticity consistent estimators are used. 
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time dummy becomes negative while the coefficient of the night dummy 
becomes positive. This can be explained by the relatively high re-
spectively low TV consumption at prime time respectively at night. If 
some Formula One consumers watch TV at a time when just few other 
people watch TV this will increase the relative viewing levels. At prime 
time this effect runs in the opposite direction. This is a phenomenon ana-
lyzed by Kipker (2003).  
In consequence the results of estimation b2 (Table 3), i.e., employing rela-
tive viewer levels instead of absolute amounts, do not lead to the rejection 
of the two hypotheses, either. They therefore confirm the conclusions 
drawn from the first estimation. 
 
5 Conclusion  
In this paper possibilities to measure the attractiveness of Formula One 
are discussed and analyzed how this attractiveness is influenced. It was 
assumed that the competitive balance could play an important role for the 
attractiveness of Formula One. To quantify this, two different indices for 
assumed influence on the attractiveness were constructed. These were the 
Gini coefficient and the relative distance between the first and the second 
driver. To measure the level of attractiveness the German TV viewer lev-
els were used. The estimation of this approach was done by using an OLS 
regression with Heteroscedasticity consistent estimators. Through this 
OLS it could be shown that the viewers do not have an absolute clear 
preference concerning the competitive balance. On the one hand there is 
the wish to see a thrilling duel at the top and on the other hand a high level 
of competitive balance is not interesting for the viewers. Furthermore, we 
could show that there has been a quadratic trend over time in the viewer 
levels. Another interesting result was that it could be shown that the 
Schumacher effect only plays a role if you use the number of TV viewers. 
Once we use the viewing rate the Schumacher effect does not play any 
role. This result of an optimal level of competitive balance which maxim-
izes the viewer’s interests differs from the results of previous studies 
Optimal Competitive Balance in Formula One 143 
 
 
 
which mostly show that a high level of competitive balance maximizes the 
attractiveness of a sport. With our paper we can refute these assumptions 
concerning the competitive balance. This finding could be the basis for 
further empirical or theoretical work. In these further studies it could at-
tempt to construct a more detailed theoretical model, which identifies the 
exact level of optimal competitive balance.  
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8 Conclusion 
 
“Fußball ist deshalb spannend, weil niemand weiß, wie das Spiel aus-
geht.” 
- Sepp Herberger, n.d. 
 
Both, economic theory and common sense, suggest that sporting competi-
tions should not be too one-sided. The factors leading to a specific out-
come of a sport competition, their interpretation as balanced or imbal-
anced and the effects of more or less balanced outcomes on the demand 
for sporting events are the topics of this thesis. In none of these areas is 
there general agreement in the sports economic literature. By providing 
new insights in these areas of research, this thesis contributes to a deeper 
understanding of competitive balance in sports.  
The way talent is allocated on the teams within a sport league is a substan-
tial area of sports economic research. Within this research area, the debate 
about a sports team’s objective is crucial. Defining the maximization of 
the sports team’s value as the objective of team owners reduces the con-
flict between the proponents of profit maximization and win-percentage 
maximization. Sports teams create revenue based on sporting success, 
which itself depends on buying talented players in a kind of vivious circle. 
Analyzing this investment circle in models, which only consider one peri-
od, yields misleading results. In a more periodic model, players are not 
only the input variable in the production of sporting success, but also a 
highly tradable asset. Furthermore, they create higher value for the teams 
they play for, as they create future revenue potential. Such revenue poten-
tial encompasses, for example, the right to compete in lucrative competi-
tions or the general fan base. Future revenue is therefore dependent on 
past success. Moreover, reinvesting profits in players is nothing other than 
an accumulation of capital. Analytically considering the value of a team 
leads to a convergence of profit and win-percentage maximization. Value 
maximization incorporates both approaches, as the difference between 
profit and win maximization constitutes the liquidity of the assets. There-
fore a loss, even if high, should not be misinterpreted necessarily as eco-
nomic failure, or overinvestment, because focusing on the flow variable of 
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profit disregards the state variable of the asset. In perfect markets, the li-
quidity of the assets should not matter for a value-maximizing firm. How-
ever, market imperfections, especially information asymmetry in the tal-
ent and capital markets, might therefore force sports teams to retain more 
players as assets than theory would suggest.  
Another argument supporting the existence of overinvestment comes from 
the application of the evolutionarily stable strategy equilibrium concept, 
although the usual approach to solve non-cooperative games is to deter-
mine the Nash equilibrium. For infinite populations, each evolutionary 
stable equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium as well. In sports leagues with a 
finite number of teams, these two equilibrium concepts do not necessarily 
coincide. Using evolutionary game theory instead of the standard non-
cooperative game theory in a sports league can be justified by the unique 
characteristics of such leagues. In sports, the quality of one team is always 
determined in relation to its competitors. In evolutionary game theory, 
payoffs have to be relatively greater in the long run in order to survive. 
However, originating from the biological analysis of evolving animal 
populations, the interpretation of evolutionary stable strategies in the con-
text of sporting contexts remains problematic. An evolutionary stable 
strategy is neither an optimal strategy, nor a rationally chosen one, let 
alone an unbeatable one. By maximizing relative fitness, an evolutionarily 
stable equilibrium is merely stable, because it cannot be invaded in the 
long run, and, as shown, can be beaten in the context of a sports league. 
As long as relative performance and relative payoffs do matter in a sports 
league, the optimal aggregate-taking strategy provides a far more intuitive 
interpretation of evolutionary stable strategies. By assuming the aggregate 
to be fixed, which, in the context of a sports league, is the total amount of 
investment, teams decide rationally on the level of talent they hire, which 
leads then to an evolutionary stable equilibrium. Furthermore, this ap-
proach shows that the debate on the appropriate equilibrium concept in a 
sports league has a lot in common with that on the wage elasticity of tal-
ent supply. Assuming a wage-inelastic talent supply, or a fixed supply of 
talent, is mathematically equivalent to assuming the aggregate level of tal-
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ent to be fixed. Using the optimal aggregate-taking strategy approach, 
considering the stability conditions and restricting the model parameters 
to reasonable values, it can further be shown that no overinvestment oc-
curs at equilibrium, neither in an evolutionarily stable, nor a Nash equilib-
rium. 
The hypothesis that sport teams tend to overinvestment is a major issue in 
sports economics, as well as with the general public. Especially for econ-
omists, this perspective is somewhat surprising, as it implies that even 
though a sport league is a form of repeated game, teams tend to make the 
same mistakes again and again and do not learn. However, simply taking 
account of occasional major losses does not justify the conclusion that 
there is overinvestment. These loses are generated by teams by their own 
choices and whether there is a general market law compelling teams to 
overinvest, is far from proven. Sports teams do always have the possibility 
to invest nothing at all, and if they invest, this has to be financed some-
how, so at least in the long run, no overinvestment should occur. In any 
event, the Financial Fair Play Regulations from the Union des Associa-
tions Européennes de Football (UEFA) were introduced in 2011 to pre-
vent football clubs from spending more than they earn. As shown, a gen-
eral issue in the economic literature when attempting to prove a tendency 
towards overinvestment, is the confusion between objectives and bench-
marks. Teams that overinvest are usually assumed to be utility maximiz-
ing. Their utility function is either their own win percentage or a weighted 
sum of their win percentage and their revenue. The investment decision of 
these teams is then evaluated by comparing only monetary values. With a 
benchmark based on profit maximization, each investment decision result-
ing from utility maximization, is thus a form of overinvestment. There-
fore, if it is assumed that sports teams tend to maximize their utility, it 
would be far more meaningful to compare their investment with a bench-
mark accounting for their utility, and not their revenue. As long as sports 
teams are able to finance their investments, even through wealthy private 
150 Conclusion 
 
 
investors or companies, there is no need for market restrictions to be im-
posed on European football clubs. 
Unequal revenue potential is one of the main reasons for a competitive 
imbalance in sports leagues. The majority of models used in the sport 
economics literature explain the uneven distribution of talent across teams 
in a sport league in terms of different market sizes. This model assump-
tion about the difference in market size forms the foundation of competi-
tive imbalance in sports leagues. This leads to the conclusion that a large 
market induces success in sport leagues, which is only partially reflected 
in reality. Having a large market is indeed needed to generate enough rev-
enue to buy success. However, success is not a monotonic function of 
market size, rather than a function with a maximum at some point. Mar-
kets exceeding this maximum size give local rivals the opportunity to pre-
vail within the same region. This reduces the revenue potential of large-
market teams, and sport teams from smaller regions with no a strong local 
rival, are therefore frequently more successful. Especially in leagues 
which incorporate some form of promotion and relegation system, which 
essentially allows any team to enter the league at some point in time, en-
dogenous markets are inevitable. As every league has a limited number of 
teams and every country has a specific population distribution, each 
league has a unique minimum market size necessary for a team to com-
pete in it. Further empirical research could hence determine this minimum 
market size for different leagues, which is also crucial for defining regions 
in which regional competition is possible.  
Beside the numerous reasons for competitive imbalance, there are also 
numerous dimensions to outcome uncertainty. Predictability is the oppo-
site of suspense, with the former having a negative and the latter a posi-
tive effect on the demand for an event. However, sports event can be un-
predictable in many respects. Hence, caution is required analyzing a com-
petition and the question is answered as to whether this competition is 
balanced and its outcome uncertain. The most common approach in the 
sports economic literature analyzing round-robin tournaments, like Euro-
pean football leagues, is to use the standard deviation of winning percent-
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ages of one season, which is sometimes compared with the expected 
standard deviation of winning percentages of an ideally balanced league. 
However, sport events can be unpredictable in many ways. Especially in 
competitions where numerous single events are aggregated into one single 
ranking, some dimensions of uncertainty remain unreflected in this rank-
ing. One dimension of uncertainty derives from the volatility of relative 
team standings from season to season. Greater similarity means more pre-
dictability, which should therefore have a negative effect on demand. 
Measuring the similarity of consecutive seasons captures the dynamic un-
certainty of outcome. The cosine similarity measure is new to sport eco-
nomics and is able to deal with problems unique to sports leagues. The 
method is able to deal with promotion and relegation, as well as the irreg-
ular absolute number of points awarded to the teams due to the 3-point 
rule. It can be shown that although static measures have yielded a slightly 
more balanced German Bundesliga in the last decades, the dynamic meas-
ure yields greater similarity and therefore a less balanced league. Taking 
account of the different dimensions of outcome uncertainty is necessary in 
order to depict the competitive balance of a league.   
These different dimensions of outcome uncertainty also influence the 
mechanism by which world champions are determined in Formula One. 
The only possible way to aggregate multiple races into one ranking is a 
scoring vector, but it is not feasible to find the best approach. The many 
possible objectives that a scoring vector could have include creating a sea-
son which is undecided for a long time or a maximum number of different 
champions or according a winning probability to drivers, which is equal to 
the relative talent distribution. All these objectives are reasonable and to-
gether with others, aggregate outcome uncertainty of Formula One. As 
there is no one scoring vector that is optimal in all mentioned areas, it is 
necessary for a chosen scoring vector to balance the different dimensions. 
Adding to the complexity of finding a best scoring vector is its depend-
ence on factors like talent distribution, which are not directly observable, 
for obvious reasons.   
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Given that each aggregation mechanism is a compromise of numerous ob-
jectives, the most important objective is certainly to ensure a high level of 
demand for the sport competition. With the greatest competitive balance, 
each competitor is equally strong, thus having the same winning probabil-
ity. As shown for Formula One, this does not create necessarily the high-
est demand for a competition. In a completely balanced competition, the 
result is dependent on pure chance, as there are no differences in quality. 
At least in Formula One, there is a demand for an unequal talent distribu-
tion and identification with well-known drivers. Hence, even an unbal-
anced competition does not imply the need to improve competitive bal-
ance in order to increase the demand for such events.  
Sports competitions need to be balanced in order to attract an audience. 
This is the uncertainty-of-outcome hypothesis, but and it is difficult to 
prove for sport events. In sports, a single event, season or couple of sea-
sons can be uncertain. There may be an uneven distribution of chance to 
win, a group of favorites competing with outsiders and even competitors 
who have no chance of winning, and yet, the competition remains uncer-
tain. Since Rottenberg (1956) stated his uncertainty-of-outcome hypothe-
sis, many explanations of why competitions are imbalanced have been 
proposed, the measures for evaluating whether a competition is balanced 
or not are numerous and the effects of unevenly balanced competition au-
dience demand continues to be analyzed. Whether it is necessary or possi-
ble to alter the competitive balance of a sport competition depends on 
numerous factors. It has been shown that the specific characteristics of a 
sport league and its teams exert a great influence on the competitive out-
come. Although the results of a sport competition are obvious after the 
fact, the interpretation of whether this result derives from a competitively 
balanced or imbalanced competition is not so clear. Applying different 
measures to the same sports event can therefore reveal an improvement as 
well as a deterioration in the competitive balance for a sport. Without cap-
turing all dimensions of uncertainty, the determination of the degree of 
competitive balance or imbalance remains vague at best. Taking account 
of all these dimensions is still not enough to explain demand, as the audi-
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ence might favor some competitors more than others and therefore, the 
dominance of a favored competitor might be accepted as enough of a rea-
son to attend. Hence, given the many dimensions of competitive balance 
and the contradictory effects on the demand side any authority claiming to 
improve competitive balance through regulatory intervention, should be 
particularly specific in their objectives. Provided the claimed objectives 
coincide with the real intentions, attempts to improve competitive balance 
remain ambiguous and regulation a case of trial and error, because the di-
mensions of competitive balance and its effects on the demand for sport 
are manifold. 
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The Uncertainty-of-Outcome Hypothesis  
and Competitive Balance in Sports
Martin Langen
Sportliche Wettkämpfe leben davon, dass Ihr Ausgang nicht vorherbe-
stimmt ist. Je ähnlicher sich Konkurrenten in ihrer sportlichen Stärke 
sind, umso weniger Gewissheit herrscht über den Ausgang des Wett-
bewerbs. Das Ausmaß der dem Wettkampf inhärenten Spannung ist, 
zumindest der Theorie nach, von entscheidender Bedeutung für die 
Nachfrage nach professionellem Sport. Die in diesem Band gesam-
melten Aufsätze untersuchen die Ursachen, Arten und Folgen unter-
schiedlicher Wahrscheinlichkeitsverteilungen bezüglich des Aus-
gangs sportlicher Wettbewerbe. Das individuelle Investitionsverhalten 
der Sport Teams erweist sich hierbei als ursächlich für die sportliche 
Unausgeglichenheit von Sport Ligen. Zudem werden die verschieden 
Dimensionen von Spannung in einer Sport Liga untersucht und neue 
Verfahren vorgestellt, diese zu messen. Darüber hinaus wird am Bei-
spiel der Formel Eins dargestellt, wie die Regeln eines sportlichen 
Wett????????????????????????????????????????????????
